Ukraine is borrowing from the future just to hang on for dear life. 2024 will be pivotal in deciding the outcome
The forthcoming second anniversary of Russia’s military operation in Ukraine is a symbolic date, but hardly a cause for celebration. In fact, events have to be studied from a considerable remove in order to see the big picture.
Positional deadlock
Any discussion of a breakthrough on the front and military defeat of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) has long been met with the counter-argument: Let us take Avdeevka (a key Donbass stronghold) first, and then we will talk. On Saturday, that goal was officially achieved.
So what now? In order to crush the enemy and impose our will, we need an effective strategy, a plan forsuccessful combat operations.
By last year, such a system was well established on the defensive side – in the absence of a multiplier advantage, neither side is yet able to break through the front with its own means and conduct successful offensive operations.
Back in the autumn, Avdeevka was described as a kind of test for the Russian Army. The Avdeevka operation began with an attempt to cut off the city and create a ring of encirclement 10km in diameter.
On October 10, after massive artillery preparations, mechanized attacks were launched in two directions – across the railway north of the Avdeevka chemical plant and from the south, from the village of Vodyanoye. Like the enemy’s attacks on Rabotino in the summer, these efforts faltered, and our command – relying on artillery, attack drones, and small assault groups – shifted the center of gravity right into the city itself.
And now, after a fifth month of fighting, the Avdeevka epic has concluded. By maintaining pressure along the entire perimeter and forcing the enemy to stretch its reserves, the Russian Army wore down the city’s garrison over several months of fighting. The situation was exacerbated by supply problems. The only paved road, though still passable and sometimes safe (in December, Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky even traveled into the besieged city on it), still did not allow for the necessary supplies and rotations, and more importantly, maintaining control of the route itself required a great deal of effort on the part of the AFU.