Attempting to pressure New Delhi over its ties with Moscow could backfire, undermining American prestige and reliability in the rising South Asian giant
Donald Trump taking office next month is causing palpable anxiety around global capitals, and not entirely without cause. Threats, tariffs and trade wars were public buzzwords during the Trump 1.0 presidency. The administration’s unpredictability, uncertainty and its stark noncommittal attitude towards its treaty partners had caused nervousness amongst US allies, especially those situated within the contested Indo-Pacific and critically dependent on American security guarantees.
The previous administration also possessed a propensity of viewing the world in exclusively economic terms rather than military-strategic considerations. Balance of trade rather than balance of power was its defining characteristic. Trump’s first presidency faced continued strife from both within and without his administration, epitomized through faltering relations with the Intelligence Community, Congress, special interests and the Washington Establishment.
His second presidency will prove to be demanding for many states. Trade, or its unbalance thereof, is going to be a prominent feature of the upcoming American foreign policy. Trump has already announced that he’ll impose 10% tariffs on China and 25% on Mexico and Canada. Fortress America is a real possibility, cascading into a Fortress Europe in turn.
As the US refocuses its efforts and engagement to the Indo-Pacific and the China Question, Trumpist America will gauge a state on the twin pillars of trade equality and proximity with Beijing.
Within the Indian subcontinent the rise of Trump is seen in a positive light. The personal chemistry shared by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and ex-US president, along with India’s strategic significance as an ally against China, provide scope for a comfortable future. India (sans trade concerns) is posited to be viewed favorably by the Trump administration as an ally in the Asian Great Game.
With Russia, however, it will be different. Winding down the Ukraine conflict would require cooperation with Moscow, whereas greater Russian engagement with China will definitely ruffle many feathers in the administration.
Keeping Indian-Russian ties relevant in this climate despite external transformations requires significant efforts which shouldn’t be underestimated. Both New Delhi and Moscow prefer a more multilateral, multipolar and non-hegemonic world order. Working towards it won’t be easy, especially since both lack the influence and strength to unilaterally enable significant change within the global governance system.
The American dilemma
Trump is coming to power in an era which is drastically divergent vis-a-vis his previous presidency. Confidence in the American power projection capabilities and global influence is seriously shaken, transnational institutions are paralyzed, American conventional deterrence is in tatters, the dollar’s dominance is questioned, and Washington is faced with the duality of a rising China and a resurgent Global South which is beginning to vocally oppose Western global hegemony.
American democracy is more complex than it appears. Polarized domestic politics is restricting the president’s room to maneuver. Given the overlap in many state organs of the American polity, whether Trump’s preferred approach towards Indian-Russian relations dominates amongst the many competing American narratives will depend on his comparative positional supremacy within the domestic political chessboard.
His inability to rollback CAATSA (the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) imposed by Congress and his visible opposition by calling it “seriously flawed” since it “encroaches on the executive branch’s authority to negotiate,” offers a definitive reality check. Similar albeit diminished power struggles can be expected from Trump’s second term since Republicans possess a majority within both the House and the Senate.
Lifting existing sanctions poses another significant bureaucratic hurdle. Soviet-era sanctions took a long time to be removed by Congress since the entire process is extremely laborious and politically unrewarding. For instance, the Jackson–Vanik amendment applied in 1974 was finally removed in 2012 by Barack Obama through the Magnitsky Act, almost 38 years after its implementation and two decades after the end of the Cold War.
Additionally, both Russia and China were identified as rivals in the 2017 National Security Strategy during Trump’s first presidential term. Whether similar actions, although unlikely, are pursued during the new Trump administration remains to be seen.
The American dilemma is that it can counter either Russia or China separately, but not both simultaneously. In gearing up for a confrontation with China, whether over economics, policy or territorial claims over Taiwan, Trump needs to: a) wind down the Ukrainian theater lest Washington get dragged into a major two-front conflict which it is ill-equipped to win, and; b) secure the confidence of its allies within the Indo-Pacific which are vital instruments of American Grand Strategy. The major conflicts of the current era have proven that costly, prolonged military entanglements by a great power usually act as force multipliers for its rivals.
View from New Delhi
For Indians, this presents a great opportunity for two reasons. First, not undertaking a balancing act between India-Russia and India-US ties – something that was an irritant with the Biden administration. Second, New Delhi hopes that sharing a common adversary in Beijing would encourage Washington to ignore other issues, such as worsening relations with Canada and lesser American interventions on issues of human rights which India considers its internal matter.
There are three major pillars of Indian-American partnership: skilled labor, trade and defense partnerships. During the Trump 1.0 presidency, the American immigration policy was viewed negatively since it increased the denial rate for H-1B visa to 24% in 2018 from an average of 6-7% during 2010-2015 period.
Nonetheless, such events ironically propelled US IT companies to open up branches within India. The restrictions on Indian immigration to the US coincided with greater Indian participation in non-Western multilateral institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
Furthermore, informal talks about an India-Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) Free Trade Zone (FTA) were ongoing since 2015. The discussions gained increased momentum during the Trump administration period, with Indian Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Russia culminating in an official signing of a framework agreement to explore an FTA. Whether Trumpist America’s ensuing foreign policy unpredictability was a factor in revitalizing greater Indian-Russian economic synergy remains an open question.
Trade between New Delhi and Washington was an irritant during Trump’s first term, with the president asking India to reduce its positive trade imbalance and imposing tariffs accordingly. At the same time, defense ties reached greater heights with the establishment of the 2+2 ministerial dialogue, the founding of the Quad grouping (Australia, India, Japan, and the US) and the signing of COMCASA (the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement), thus increasing interoperability and American high-end technology sales.
If Quad cooperation intensifies in the foreseeable future (which is highly probable), Trump may expect more from India than just passive balancing acts between Washington and its rivals. At the same time New Delhi is well aware that in the current post-pandemic, post-liberal and post-American world the ‘non-West’ is as popular and in vogue as the West.
Trying to paint the Indian leadership into a difficult corner regarding their relationship with longtime allies like Russia may prove to be counterproductive by damaging American prestige (and reliability) in the eyes of New Delhi. On the other hand, even if Trump is expected on a personal level to be more accommodating to Indian-Russian relations, his premature declarations of ending the ongoing Ukraine conflict should be viewed skeptically.
Trump doesn’t represent the entirety of the American administration which also includes lawmakers, lobby groups, vested interests, defense corporations, think tanks, advocacy groups, etc, which may possess differing interpretations and complicate the president’s tasks. Additionally, in the wake of its ongoing battlefield successes, Russia currently has no incentive to sue for peace short of achieving its stated military goals.
Trump’s focus on China is precisely why relations with Russia (and consequently US attitude towards Indian-Russian ties) are predicted to be complicated – Moscow’s greater proximity towards Beijing will naturally be viewed negatively by the new administration, irrespective of the fact that certain policies of the previous administration were themselves responsible for pushing Moscow closer to Beijing.
Further, oil trade will be a cause for concern since Trump will want India to purchase crude from America rather than from Russia. How the three countries tackle this delicate dilemma will determine the future of US-Indian-Russian relations.
