In the theatre of global diplomacy, optics matter. And in recent years, the optics from Europe have been unflattering. Whether in NATO summits, G7 meetings, or high‑stakes bilateral encounters, the European Union has too often appeared less like a bloc of sovereign actors and more like a council of ministers to an American presidency.
The pattern is not new. From the Iraq War in 2003 to the Libya intervention in 2011, from sanctions regimes to the current Ukraine strategy, Europe’s foreign policy reflex has been to align with Washington’s priorities — even when the costs to its own economies and strategic autonomy are severe. But the past two years have stripped away the polite fiction of equality.
The Transatlantic Reflex
The second Trump administration has made no secret of its transactional approach to allies. Demands for higher European defence spending, unconditional alignment on Russia and China, and even the suggestion that Europe should “occupy” Ukraine after a settlement with Moscow have been met with muted dissent but ultimate compliance.
The Atlantic Council’s own policy agenda for 2025 openly frames the U.S.–EU relationship as a “geopolitical necessity” — a phrase that, while accurate in describing shared interests, also betrays the asymmetry. Washington sets the tempo; Brussels follows the beat.
This is not merely about military dependence through NATO. It extends to trade, technology policy, and sanctions. When the U.S. imposed sweeping restrictions on Chinese tech firms, Europe — despite its own economic exposure — largely fell in line. When Washington escalated sanctions on Russia, the EU not only matched them but in some cases went further, even as energy prices spiked and industries faltered.
India’s Divergent Path
Contrast this with India’s conduct under similar — and arguably greater — pressure. In August 2025, President Donald Trump’s administration doubled tariffs on Indian goods to 50 percent, explicitly to punish New Delhi for continuing to buy discounted Russian crude. The message was clear: fall in line with U.S. sanctions policy or pay the price.
India’s response was equally clear. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in three major speeches that month, rejected what he called “self‑centred economic policies” and vowed never to compromise on the interests of farmers, fishermen, and small entrepreneurs. “No matter how much pressure comes, we will keep increasing our strength to withstand it,” he told a rally in Ahmedabad.
External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar was even more direct. At a joint press conference with German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul, he said India’s energy policy was guided by national interest and “strategic autonomy,” not foreign diktats. He reminded his audience that predictability and reliability in partnerships — not subservience — were the real currency of diplomacy.
When Western critics accused India of financing Russia’s war, the Ministry of External Affairs pointed out the hypocrisy: the EU itself maintained €67.5 billion in goods trade with Russia in 2024.
The Doctrine of Strategic Autonomy
Jaishankar’s public remarks over the past year have crystallised into a coherent doctrine. It rests on three pillars:
- Non‑negotiable core interests — agriculture, energy security, and sovereignty in decision‑making.
- Multi‑alignment — engaging simultaneously with the U.S., Russia, China, the EU, and the Global South.
- Economic self‑reliance — reducing external leverage through domestic manufacturing and diversified trade.
This is not anti‑Americanism; it is a refusal to be subsumed by another’s priorities. As Jaishankar told the Economic Times World Leaders Forum, “Our aim is to advance every relationship that serves our interests… It’s not about personality X or president Y.”
Europe’s Missed Opportunities
Europe has the economic weight, technological sophistication, and diplomatic reach to pursue a similar course. Yet it rarely does. Even France’s occasional calls for “strategic autonomy” within NATO are quickly diluted in the name of transatlantic unity.
The result is a bloc that too often negotiates with Washington from a position of dependency. When Trump demanded that Europe shoulder more of Ukraine’s defence burden while hinting at a reduced U.S. commitment, the EU’s response was not to chart an independent security policy but to plead for continued American engagement.
This dependency is not without cost. The rush to replace Russian gas with U.S. LNG has locked Europe into long‑term contracts at higher prices. Compliance with U.S. sanctions has closed off markets in Asia and Africa where European firms once thrived. And the political capital spent maintaining alignment with Washington has limited Europe’s ability to act as a credible mediator in conflicts from the Middle East to the Indo‑Pacific.
Lessons from New Delhi
India’s defiance in the face of U.S. tariffs is not a template Europe can copy wholesale; the structural realities are different. But the principles are transferable.
First, define red lines and communicate them clearly. Modi’s refusal to open India’s dairy sector to U.S. imports, despite the risk of a trade war, is a case in point.
Second, diversify partnerships. India’s simultaneous engagement with Russia, China, and the West ensures it is never cornered by a single power bloc. Europe’s over‑reliance on the U.S. leaves it vulnerable to policy swings in Washington.
Third, invest in self‑reliance. India’s Atmanirbhar Bharat push is not isolationism; it is a hedge against external coercion. Europe’s dependence on U.S. defence technology and energy supplies is a strategic liability.
From Vassalage to Voice
The choice before Europe is stark. It can continue to operate as the junior partner in a transatlantic hierarchy, hoping that American interests will always align with its own. Or it can, like India, embrace the messy, sometimes uncomfortable work of strategic autonomy — building the capacity to say “no” when national interests demand it.
As Jaishankar told his German counterpart in September 2025, “We are witnessing significant and far‑reaching changes on the global strategic landscape… Those changes make a very compelling case for a deeper, stronger, wider India‑Germany relationship”. The subtext was unmistakable: partnerships should be built on mutual benefit, not unilateral compliance.
Europe has the means to be a pole in a multipolar world. What it lacks is the will. Until that changes, the image of European leaders deferring to Washington will remain more than just bad optics — it will be an accurate reflection of reality.