After 37 years of studying North Korean affairs, I’m often asked how I continue to track current issues and where I get my information, despite being retired from active service. My response is simple: I’m what you might call a “North Korea enthusiast” who enjoys thinking from the perspective of three generations of leadership – Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un. Being outside official circles means I don’t need smoking-gun intelligence; for early warning analysis and strategic forecasting, logical thinking and innovative ideas suffice. Rather than actively seeking information, I’ve established multiple networks that function like spider webs, catching relevant details that I then weave into my own analysis.
As we close this year, I present my perspective on North Korea’s trajectory for 2025. While this analysis may not match the comprehensive assessments of government agencies and private research institutes, it offers unique insights. Let’s begin with a brief review of 2024’s key developments.
Key Developments in 2024
The most significant development was Kim Jong Un’s introduction of the “Hostile Two-State Theory” through his speeches at the Party Plenary Meeting on Dec. 30, 2023, and the Supreme People’s Assembly on Jan. 15, 2024. This represented a Copernican revolution in North Korean policy by rejecting the concept of unified Korean ethnicity, designating South Korea as the primary enemy state, and explicitly diverging from his predecessors’ approach toward South Korea.
Kim Jong Un’s shift from dialogue and cooperation to confrontation with South Korea was driven by several factors: first, the need to counter the increasing spread of individualism and admiration for South Korea among North Korean citizens exposed to foreign information, particularly South Korean popular culture; second, the tactical advantages of dividing South Korean public opinion and pressuring the United States; and third, Kim’s psychological need to differentiate himself from his predecessors, possibly stemming from what might be described as an “illegitimate son-Oedipus complex” from his childhood.
This independent course was supported by concrete actions: strengthening internal controls and promoting Kim Jong Un’s personality cult (abolishing the Juche calendar, reducing emphasis on the Day of the Sun, distributing Kim’s portraits and badges), focusing on military capabilities enhancement, conducting balloon provocations against South Korea (32 instances), signing a mutual defense treaty with Russia, and deploying troops (approximately 12,000) to the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
The most crucial factor driving Kim’s “Hostile Two-State Theory” appears to be his assessment that traditional unification tactics based on exchange and cooperation were actually undermining regime stability through the spread of South Korean influence. This led to a strategic shift toward separation and containment policies to ensure regime security while strengthening nuclear capabilities for potential forceful reunification.
This intention was clearly expressed in Kim’s statement at the Eighth Party Central Committee’s Ninth Plenary Meeting in December 2023: “Despite South Korea’s government changing more than ten times, its fundamental approach to unification under a liberal democratic system has remained absolutely unchanged. Attempts at absorption-based unification have been consistent, regardless of whether they called themselves ‘democratic’ or wore the mask of ‘conservative.’”
However, North Korean authorities have been implementing these strategic changes gradually, using a combination of demonstrative actions and measured build-up, likely to minimize negative impacts on their population and reduce diplomatic complications during the U.S. election period and the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Five Key Areas to Watch in 2025
For 2025, the second year of the “Hostile Two-State Theory,” five critical areas deserve attention: Kim Jong Un’s independent policy direction, the war against South Korean cultural influence, outcomes of North Korean troop deployment in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, potential second “bromance” with Trump, and possible provocations for political manipulation. The timing and method of a potential Russia-Ukraine war ceasefire will be a crucial variable affecting these developments.
While nuclear capability enhancement and efforts to overcome chronic economic difficulties remain overarching priorities, these are constant factors in North Korean policy and thus not included in the five key areas to watch. Including these would effectively make it seven areas of focus.
The year 2025 holds particular significance as it marks the final year of the five-year economic and defense development plan, the second year of both the “Hostile Two-State Theory” and the “20×10 Local Development Policy,” the 80th anniversary of liberation (Aug. 15) and the Workers’ Party founding (Oct. 10), and requires the election of the 15th Supreme People’s Assembly deputies. It’s also the year before the Ninth Party Congress scheduled for January 2026 (though it could be convened earlier).
The regime will likely intensify efforts to demonstrate achievements under Kim’s independent leadership. This could culminate in the declaration of “Kim Jong Un’s Strong State Year” at the Ninth Party Congress, potentially accompanied by measures such as designating Kim’s birthday (Jan. 8) as a national holiday and revealing new constitutional territorial provisions.
The ongoing “war” against South Korean cultural influence, implemented through increasingly strict laws and controls, remains a critical challenge for the regime. Eight major laws enacted since 2020, including the Anti-Reactionary Thought Culture Rejection Law which imposes death penalties for distribution of South Korean media, demonstrate the regime’s determination to combat external influences that could fundamentally threaten Kim Jong-un’s rule.
The outcome of North Korean military support for Russia will become clearer in 2025, particularly with Trump’s potential return to power and his pledge to end the Ukraine conflict quickly. Success or failure in this gambit could significantly impact North Korea’s international position and internal stability.
Regarding nuclear weapons, North Korea shows no signs of considering denuclearization. Recent actions, including the legalization of nuclear possession, expansion of uranium enrichment facilities, military cooperation with China and Russia, troop deployment to Ukraine, and ICBM tests, all indicate North Korea’s commitment to maintaining its nuclear arsenal.
While Trump has shown conciliatory gestures, Kim Jong Un is likely to focus on consolidating the “Hostile Two-State Theory” and cooperation with Putin before considering any diplomatic engagement with the U.S. A second “bromance” similar to 2018 might only become possible in the latter half of 2025, after Trump addresses domestic economic issues and the Ukraine conflict.
Conclusion
While 2024 was a year of crisis and decision for Kim Jong Un, 2025 may present opportunities for consolidation and achievement. Predictions of regime collapse or succession by Kim Ju Ae likely overextend partial observations into broader conclusions without sufficient supporting evidence.
National security and inter-Korean relations require objective assessment free from wishful thinking or preconceptions. Under the “Hostile Two-State Theory,” North Korea will likely continue its strategy of dismissing South Korea while attempting to foment internal division. The South Korean government must maintain a dignified stance while proactively managing potential provocations and crises.
As the international order realigns following Trump’s return to power, South Korea must engage in strategic communication with the international community beyond the peninsula’s immediate concerns. Both government and private sectors should assertively pursue South Korea’s core values: North Korean denuclearization, establishment of a peace regime, mutual economic benefits, and improvement of human rights in North Korea, all from the perspective of South Korea’s enhanced international status and future-oriented outlook.
December 31, 2024 at 07:15AM
by DailyNK(North Korean Media)