President Lee Jae-myung’s recent visit to Beijing, the first by a South Korean leader since 2019, marks a tentative reset in China–South Korea relations at a moment of deep regional uncertainty. The absence of explicit references to denuclearization in his talks with President Xi underscores both the limits of current diplomacy and the opportunity for China’s Global Security Initiative to reshape the trajectory of the Korean Peninsula.
To complement the Belt and Road Initiative, China has recently launched a series of Global Initiatives – Development, Security, Civilizations, and Governance. Under the framework of the Global Security Initiative (GSI), China is well-positioned to revive a multilateral platform for restarting denuclearization negotiations with North Korea – building on the precedent of the Six-Party Talks held between 2003 and 2009. The GSI provides a theoretical rationale for reconciling China’s longstanding stability-first approach with a gradual, credible denuclearization process grounded in multilateral governance.
Four integrated objectives emerge from this framework. First, the GSI serves as a theoretical framework for relaunching the Six-Party Talks and embedding denuclearization within a multilateral security process. Second, such a framework creates space for China to assume a stronger global leadership role. Third, progress on denuclearization can be linked to the construction of a new regional security architecture through the revival of the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism(NEAPSM). Fourth, sustained leadership in managing the Korean Peninsula would strengthen China’s new leadership role and pave the way to achieving its national policy goal of unification with Taiwan.
Theoretical Framework: Global Security Initiative
Since its establishment in 2022, the GSI has articulated a vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable global and regional security. The GSI offers a coherent framework through which China can approach denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula as a comprehensive security governance challenge embedded in regional political, economic, and strategic interdependence. Taken together with the 2023 GSI Concept Paper and the 2025 White Paper on China’s National Security , the GSI’s application to the Korean Peninsula becomes analytically clear. Denuclearization is viable only if it is aligned with – and sequentially supports – the four interlinked pillars of Chinese national security.
1. Political (Regime) Security as the Foundation
The GSI’s emphasis on indivisible security directly addresses Pyongyang’s core concern: regime survival. A GSI-based framework prioritizes political security through credible multilateral assurances against regime-change and external coercion. In practical terms, this would involve reviving a multilateral forum – modeled on the Six-Party Talks – that formally incorporates commitments to non-interference, mutual respect for sovereignty, and a peace mechanism to replace the armistice. By embedding the DPRK’s security concerns within a collectively guaranteed arrangement, China can reduce Pyongyang’s reliance on nuclear weapons as its ultimate deterrent.
2. Economic Security as the Base
The GSI complements China’s Global Development Initiative by linking denuclearization to phased economic integration. Economic security functions as the material incentive structure for political commitments. Under a revived multilateral platform, China could coordinate conditional development assistance, infrastructure connectivity, and humanitarian cooperation tied to verifiable steps in arms control and risk reduction. This approach reframes denuclearization as a pathway to sustainable development, aligning with China’s long-standing preference for stability-driven economic engagement.
3. Military, Science and Technology, Cultural, and Social Security as the Guarantee
The GSI’s opposition to bloc confrontation and military alliances provides a foundation for reshaping the Peninsula’s security architecture, moving it away from escalation dynamics. Scientific and technological cooperation, including nuclear safety, environmental protection, and disaster management, further contributes to social security and trust-building across the region.
4. International Security as the Support Structure
Finally, the GSI situates the Korean Peninsula within a broader regional and global security order based on consultation, inclusiveness, and shared responsibility. A revived Six-Party Talks–style mechanism institutionalized under GSI and the Global Governance Initiative (GGI) would distribute the costs and guarantees of denuclearization across all stakeholders, reducing unilateral burdens and strategic mistrust.
5. Building a Regional Security Mechanism
China could also revive the idea of regional regime-building. In 2007, there was an effort to transform the Six-Party Talks into a permanent security architecture for Northeast Asia through the establishment of the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism (NEAPSM). At the time, the working group was initiated by South Korea, but was strongly supported by China, and included participation of North Korea and Japan.
However, for the NEAPSM to be realized, the North Korean nuclear issue must enter a phase of nuclear dismantlement. Denuclearization cannot be achieved through bilateral diplomacy alone. No single actor possesses the full set of incentives, guarantees, and enforcement mechanisms required to alter the DPRK’s strategic calculus. The U.S. lacks credibility in Pyongyang as a guarantor of regime survival. China cannot unilaterally deliver sanctions relief, international legitimacy, development financing, and security guarantees. South Korea and Japan have substantial economic capacity but limited political leverage over the DPRK. Russia, meanwhile, is unlikely to subsidize the DPRK’s economic development in the post-Ukrainian war environment.
Success of Six-Party Talks 2.0 paving the way to Taiwan’s unification
The success of China-led Six-Party Talks 2.0 in transforming the security architecture on the Korean Peninsula is likely to contribute to conditions more conducive to the peaceful unification of Taiwan by altering two key strategic variables:
● First, at the international level, such success would reframe China’s role. Rather than being viewed primarily through the lens of hawkish intentions toward Taiwan, China would increasingly be recognized as a provider of global security. It would also demonstrate its capacity to lead a multilateral security process and play a stabilizing role in the region.
● Second, the perceived necessity of a U.S.-ROK-Japan military alliance would diminish. Regional economic cooperation would gain priority, supported by improved security predictability. In this context, China could anchor the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism as a viable institution within the global security architecture.
● Third, a contraction of U.S. influence on the Korean Peninsula would reflect changing strategic conditions. As denuclearization lowers the salience of military alliances, China would be well-positioned to enhance regional prosperity by prioritizing economic interdependence, development financing, and inclusive security frameworks. In this scenario, stability would be sustained less by deterrence and more by shared economic stakes, with China acting as a central convening power in Northeast Asia.
Within this environment, Taiwan’s domestic political discourse would begin to evolve – not as a result of pressure, but due to improved external conditions. Several dynamics would converge:
● First, the perceived inevitability of conflict would decline. Effective management of the Korean Peninsula would challenge the assumption that regional security problems involving China inevitably escalate toward war, weakening narratives that frame China-Taiwan relations as unavoidably zero-sum.
● Second, economic and social integration trends would deepen as China’s soft power and influence expand. With greater regional stability, China-Taiwan economic engagement would become less politicized. Taiwanese businesses, professionals, and younger generations increasingly experience the mainland not as a threat, but as a complex society offering opportunity and mobility.
● Third, confidence in Taiwan’s autonomy arrangements would become a subject of renewed, albeit cautious debate. While skepticism would persist, particularly given prior experiences in Hong Kong, Taiwanese policymakers and civil society actors would begin to distinguish between past cases and potential future arrangements tailored specifically to Taiwan. The absence of coercive pressure becomes a critical enabling factor for this transition.
Against this backdrop, Beijing should continue cooperation in areas such as disaster relief, public health, climate resilience, education exchanges, and regulatory coordination through other initiatives such as the Global Development and Global Civilization Initiatives. Over time, these channels acquire greater political significance, creating stronger cooperation through soft power.
Finally, this paves the way to the recalibration of Taiwan’s internal political spectrum. While independence-oriented views persist, a growing segment of society begins to view permanent separation as neither cost-free nor strategically optimal. At the same time, fears of forced absorption diminish due to sustained Chinese restraint and demonstrated respect for Taiwan’s unification with certain autonomy.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the Korean Peninsula represents not a peripheral challenge but a strategic test case for China’s emerging global security vision. By aligning with the internationalist perspective and prioritizing denuclearization through the Global Security Initiative, China can reconcile its long-standing stability concerns with a durable, rules-based regional order. Reviving multilateral negotiations, institutionalizing mechanisms such as the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism, and linking security progress to economic integration would demonstrate that China can translate normative frameworks into concrete outcomes. Success on the Korean Peninsula would not only reduce nuclear risk and enhance regional prosperity, but also recalibrate strategic perceptions of China’s leadership across East Asia. In this sense, denuclearization is not an isolated objective: it is the foundation upon which China’s broader ambitions for regional stability, global security governance, and peaceful conflict resolution – including across the Taiwan Strait – can credibly rest.
January 12, 2026 at 07:17AM
by DailyNK(North Korean Media)