In a previous column, I wrote that North Korea changed the name of the party’s United Front Department to Bureau 10. I explained this was due to its shift from open unification duties to covert operations against South Korea. Some readers commented that North Korean operations against the South were actually at their most extreme in the past, particularly during the 1980s. This is true.
The pro-democracy movement erupted on South Korean university campuses following the Gwangju Uprising of May 18, 1980. North Korea recognized this opportunity and launched aggressive operations. Throughout the 1980s, North Korean spies infiltrated the South, recruited pro-North Korean sympathizers (including university students), and manipulated student and labor movements to serve Pyongyang’s interests by establishing underground organizations and party cells. Let’s examine North Korea’s operations and underground activities in South Korea during this period.
Goals and Methods of North Korea’s Operations
The primary goal of North Korea’s operations in the 1980s was to overthrow the South Korean government by developing revolutionary capacity within the country.
These operations took two main forms: armed attacks and the establishment of underground organizations through spy infiltration. The former included the 1983 terrorist bombing in Rangoon, Burma, and the 1987 bombing of a Korean Air flight over the Middle East. Notable examples of the latter were the “Seoul Spy case” of 1984 and the “Ri Son Sil case” of 1985, where a female North Korean spy was arrested while conducting espionage after entering South Korea with a false identity via Japan.
North Korea’s objectives in sending operatives to South Korea were threefold: cultivating revolutionary capacity (including organizing student and labor movements), creating political and social instability (by manipulating anti-American and anti-government movements), and establishing spy networks to gather intelligence. To achieve these goals, operatives spread the so-called Jusapa ideology—a perspective embraced by South Korean activists who favored North Korea’s Juche ideology—among university students and labor activists by recruiting pro-North Korean individuals and building underground networks. North Korea used shortwave radio broadcasts like “Voice of National Salvation” for propaganda. As North Korea was relatively economically stable at the time and Kim Il Sung’s regime was firmly established, Pyongyang could aggressively pursue a revolutionary strategy in South Korea.
Orders for operations came from Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) organizations responsible for South Korean affairs. Four WPK organizations handled these matters: the United Front Department, International Liaison Department, Operations Department, and Bureau 35. The Reconnaissance Bureau of the army’s General Staff Department and the Ministry of State Security were also involved. The International Liaison Department recruited and expanded pro-North Korean organizations in South Korea and managed the infiltration of spies into South Korean political parties and civic groups. In 2009, the Operations Department and Bureau 35 were incorporated into the General Staff Department’s Reconnaissance Bureau to form the Reconnaissance General Bureau, while the International Liaison Department became affiliated with the Cabinet and was renamed Bureau 225.
Communication Methods and Organization
North Korea’s methods for delivering orders were direct and secretive, generally falling into four categories:
- Face-to-face meetings: As in the Ri Son Sil case, agents like Ri personally contacted underground organizations to deliver orders.
- Shortwave radio: North Korea used shortwave broadcasts like “Voice of National Salvation” to transmit encrypted orders. Spies used decryption keys to interpret the content. Most spy operations utilized this method, including Ri Son Sil.
- Encrypted correspondence: Orders were disguised as ordinary letters or documents, with messages conveyed using secret ink or encrypted text. The 1987 “Guro Industrial Complex spy case” exemplifies this approach, where North Korea directed industrial actions by sending encrypted letters to factory workers.
- Dead drops: Orders, weapons, cash, and forged documents were hidden in specific locations for collection by underground operatives. The 1984 Seoul spy case demonstrates this method, with North Korean spies informing South Korean operatives about locations (such as under rocks along the Hangang River) or items (like film cases) where they could find hidden operational funds or written instructions.
Underground Activities and Their Impact
As described earlier, North Korea’s operations in the 1980s involved training students and workers in Juche ideology to develop university and labor organizations as revolutionary forces and inciting anti-government and anti-American protests. A significant example was the 1983 Student League to Save Our Country (Guhangnyeon) case, orchestrated by Ri Son Sil. In this case, Jeong Gi-yeol, a pro-North Korean scholar active in the United States who collaborated with Ri, likely had direct contact with North Korea. Many figures connected to the student movement were arrested in 1983 for violating the National Security Law due to this case. In 1986, a Jusapa-based student organization centered around activist Kim Young-hwan was formally established as Guhangnyeon. It appears Kim had no direct connection with Ri.
Kim Young-hwan, the author of “Kang Chol’s Letters” (1987), which provided the ideological foundation for the Jusapa faction of the South Korean student movement, led the faction himself but was arrested in 1991 for violating the National Security Law. He underwent an ideological transformation while imprisoned. However, two of his associates, Ha Young-ok and Lee Seok-ki, did not change their views. Ha and Lee maintained their relationship with the National Democratic Revolutionary Party, founded by younger Jusapa faction members in 1992. This underground party had direct ties to the International Liaison Department, a North Korean operational organization.
During his time with Guhangnyeon, Lee coordinated student activists in Gyeonggi Province. After Guhangnyeon disbanded, he formed and led the East Gyeonggi Alliance, comprising students from Sungkyunkwan University, Hanyang University, Inha University, and Kyonggi University. Within this alliance operated a covert organization called the Revolutionary Organization (RO). In the 2000s, Lee joined the United Progressive Party, won a National Assembly seat in 2012, and was arrested the following year for inciting insurrection with the RO. The group was exposed for discussing the overthrow of South Korea’s government and armed uprisings during a secret meeting. Lee believed the time was ripe for revolution in South Korea. After serving eight years in prison, he was released in December 2021. Key figures from the East Gyeonggi Alliance continue their political activities from Seongnam.
“High Tide of Revolution”
Lee’s reference to the “high tide of revolution” derives from Lenin and North Korea’s theory of armed revolution. Lenin used this term to describe the ideal moment for revolution around the 1917 Russian Revolution. Like the highest point of seawater, it signifies when social and political conditions are optimal for revolution—when internal discontent reaches its peak and the existing regime has weakened. Lenin believed that failing to act decisively when this revolutionary tide crested meant missing a crucial opportunity. North Korea’s Juche ideology and armed revolution theory similarly posit that revolutionary opportunities emerge during severe social crises.
Lee actively urged RO members to take action, believing that the inter-Korean situation (particularly the North Korean nuclear crisis) and social instability in South Korea created favorable conditions for revolutionary activity. During their secret meeting, he reportedly called for insurrection, encouraging attendees to “pick up guns and fight.” Approximately 130 working-level members attended, each representing about 50 others. While ultimately a “rash judgment,” the domestic and international circumstances led them to believe revolution was imminent.
What about the current situation? We can make some inferences from the recent “Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) spy case” and various regional espionage incidents. In the KCTU case, organization members categorized potential assets into five levels: passive elements, fellow travelers, passionate elements, active elements, and mission-ready individuals. The fourth level—active elements—read North Korean revolutionary literature and praise the North Korean regime. These are essentially Jusapa adherents who align with North Korea. The fifth level—mission-ready individuals—qualify for direct contact with North Korean agents. In essence, they are embedded agents.
Given that the KCTU infiltrators began their full-scale activities in 2017, they operated for seven years before being discovered last year. How many Jusapa followers or, worse, embedded agents might have been cultivated during those eight years? It’s truly alarming. I wonder if they too believed we were at a “high tide for revolution.” Security and investigative authorities need to address these remaining elements and prevent any potential revolutionary activity from developing further.
March 20, 2025 at 03:04PM
by DailyNK(North Korean Media)