In the December 2024 New York Times opinion article, “Trump-Kim, Part II, Could Shake Up the World,” Dmitri Alperovitch and Sergey Radchenko propose a plan for the Trump administration to strike a deal with North Korea. The authors’ arguments can be summarized as follows:
1) The United States should abandon its goal of complete denuclearization of North Korea in favor of a moratorium. In exchange, the U.S. would lift sanctions, normalize diplomatic and trade relations, and offer a peace treaty to end the Korean War, thereby establishing permanent peace and stability in the region.
2) The U.S. can use the DPRK as a wedge to undermine the nascent coalition of America’s adversaries, including North Korea, Russia, and China. Alperovitch and Radchenko regard the DPRK as the coalition’s “weak link.”
While well-intentioned, this approach is flawed and ultimately risks undermining regional stability and global security. The Trump administration would encounter a dead end if it pursued this path. This is for six reasons.
First, the authors misconceived that the DPRK’s hostile relations with other countries with different systems are a result of the development of its nuclear weapons and that eliminating nuclear weapons will result in permanent peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. In fact, nuclear weapons are the outcome of North Korea’s confrontational foreign policy, which is a result of its ruling ideology of juche – which North Korea claims is a scientifically advanced, sublimated form of conventional socialism armed with class struggle. As Mikhail Gorbachev once said, foreign policy is a continuation of domestic policy, which is the embodiment of ideology. Similarly, Eduard Shevardnadze stated: “Coexistence based on such premises as nonaggression, respect of sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, and so on is incompatible with class struggle.” Consequently, to ensure permanent peace and stability in the Korean peninsula, the ruling ideology of the DPRK which is the root cause of hostility must be altered; the sole introduction of a moratorium would not solve this.
Second, the North Korean economy, adapted from the Soviet Union’s, is an extractive system based upon the state owning the means of production – an embodiment of the ideology of class struggle. No country with such a system has ever achieved economic development. As recent Nobel prize laureates Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson explained in their book, Why Nations Fail, an extractive system impedes economic development since only a few chosen members receive benefits to the detriment of most people. The DPRK uses resources to reinforce its military power rather than fostering economic development. Further, North Korea’s economic disparity with the South is staggering with the South’s GDP being nearly 60 times larger than the North’s – a fact precluding the establishment of peaceful coexistence between the two countries.
Third, for the DPRK, nuclear weapons, which have been enshrined in the constitution since 2023, are a “treasured sword” that serves as a means of securing the regime’s legitimacy. Therefore, a moratorium freezing the development of nuclear weapons, as proposed by the authors, would require counterbalancing if North Korea wishes to prevent its demise. Economic development would provide an alternative form of legitimacy. Achieving it requires market-oriented reforms, which in turn necessitate a radical altering of the DPRK’s hostile ideology of class struggle.
Fourth, the U.S. does not have all the necessary ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’ to exert pressure on North Korea and form a wedge between the DPRK, China, and Russia alliance. The primary means of exerting pressure on North Korea is sanctions. Since 2006, the UN Security Council has passed nine resolutions imposing comprehensive sanctions on North Korea; the U.S. alone can neither lift nor impose new sanctions. Furthermore, ‘carrots’ in the form of a peace treaty between the two Koreas, security guarantees from Russia and China, and development funds primarily from South Korea and Japan need the support of all the stakeholders; the U.S. cannot act alone. Moreover, the authors underestimate China’s influence over North Korea. Despite the sanctions, China remains North Korea’s largest trading partner, accounting for 98% of its trade. Furthermore, it is the only socialist country with which North Korea is bound by a comprehensive treaty – the Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty. Therefore, China will be unwilling to support a policy that significantly weakens its leverage over the DPRK. A successful North Korea strategy requires formulating a package deal that Kim Jong-un cannot refuse and that all members of the Six-Party Talks will endorse.
Fifth, previous attempts to negotiate moratoria between the U.S. and the DPRK all failed and there is no evidence that a new moratorium would succeed. President Clinton, in 1994, developed the Agreed Framework with then-North Korean leader Kim Jong-il in which the DPRK committed to freeze its nuclear program in exchange for Washington providing two light-water reactors. Yet the U.S. grew suspicious of North Korea, so the reactors were not delivered and the agreement fell apart with the DPRK eventually expelling IAEA experts and withdrawing from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Sixth, Alperovitch and Radchenko’s proposal is based on the premise that nuclear weapons are an end unto themselves when in reality, nuclear weapons are a means of survival for the DPRK. Should Trump offer a deal providing a better chance of survival without nuclear weapons, Kim Jong-un will accept it. Kim’s open, frank discussions with both then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in are a living testimony that he is genuinely willing to give up his nuclear program. Ignoring Kim’s previous declarations results in a flawed premise and weakens the authors’ proposal.
Trump has one viable option for any deal with Kim to achieve strategic success: to devise a package deal that upon acceptance would ensure the DPRK a better chance of survival as a non-nuclear weapon state. This deal would include security guarantees, the lifting of sanctions collectively through the UN, and sufficient development funds appropriated over ten years largely from South Korea and Japan with the condition that North Korea implements market-oriented reforms to achieve economic development. Such a deal would provide sufficient incentives to denuclearize as Kim would be able to:
1) Protect the sovereignty and shield the integrity of the DPRK by achieving rapid sustained economic development;
2) Achieve the finest possible legacy for himself and North Korea by improving the lives of millions by bringing them into a prosperous middle-class;
3) Establish a foundation for economic modernization that ensures the integrity of the succession beyond Kim’s tenure and the longevity of the DPRK;
4) Provide benefits to all stakeholder nations by making the Korean Peninsula nuclear-free with the removal of U.S. ground troops, establishing permanent peace, stability, and joint economic prosperity.
Trump has a historic opportunity to consummate a landmark deal that will define his presidency and legacy. Such a deal calls for a bold and audacious plan that ensures the DPRK’s survival and is a win-win for all stakeholders involved. A U.S.-led moratorium would be not only fragile but also undermine regional and global stability and security. On the other hand, a comprehensive package deal within the framework of the Six-Party Talks would finally lead to long-awaited peace and stability in Northeast Asia.
January 31, 2025 at 07:06AM
by DailyNK(North Korean Media)