The institutionalization of United States-Japan-Republic of Korea (ROK) cooperation since 2023 marks a qualitative shift in Northeast Asia’s security environment. The Camp David Summit established a regularized trilateral framework encompassing leader-level consultations, real-time missile-warning data sharing, and expanded joint military exercises. These arrangements go beyond ad hoc coordination and are widely interpreted as a long-term mechanism.[1] [2]
For China, this development alters the strategic context in which regional diplomacy operates. While the trilateral framework is officially framed by its participants as defensive and DPRK-focused, its institutional features – standing consultation mechanisms, operational interoperability, and shared threat assessments – create structural effects that extend beyond the Korean Peninsula. Once alliance coordination becomes routinized, it tends to acquire momentum independent of the original trigger.[3]
In response, China faces a set of strategic choices rather than a single predetermined path. Existing analyses point to three broad options. The first is “strategic ambiguity”, in which China avoids explicit alignment while maintaining flexibility between deterrence, reassurance, and selective cooperation. The second is collusion, understood here as a visible tilt toward closer strategic coordination with Russia and the DPRK, creating the external perception of an opposing bloc. The third is a win-win approach, in which the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is successfully accomplished under Chinese leadership within the Six-Party multilateral framework.
While all three options remain available in theory, they differ significantly in cost, controllability, and long-term effectiveness. The collusion scenario deserves closer examination – not as a preferred policy, but as a risk pathway that may appear attractive under pressure yet ultimately undermines China’s strategic interests. Clarifying this distinction is essential for evaluating China’s realistic policy options in the evolving regional order.
The collusion scenario: logic and drivers
Collusion refers to a visible and sustained tilt by China toward closer strategic coordination with Russia and the DPRK, short of a formal alliance but sufficient to generate the external perception of bloc formation. This may include more frequent high-level political signaling, tolerance of expanded Russia-DPRK cooperation, and coordinated diplomatic or security messaging in response to U.S.-Japan-ROK alignment.
From a short-term perspective, collusion can appear attractive under conditions of heightened pressure. As U.S.-Japan-ROK cooperation becomes more institutionalized, China may perceive a narrowing of strategic space and reduced influence over regional security dynamics. Several analysts argue that tighter trilateral coordination increases Beijing’s incentive to demonstrate countervailing leverage, particularly on the Korean Peninsula, where China retains unique influence.[4]
Collusion also offers signaling value. Visible coordination with Russia and the DPRK can serve as a reminder that China possesses options to complicate U.S.-led security frameworks. Domestic considerations may reinforce this logic, as assertive external behavior can signal resolve in the face of perceived encirclement.
For these reasons, collusion should be treated analytically as a risk pathway rather than a stable policy solution. Understanding why it appears tempting under pressure is essential, but so is recognizing the structural forces that limit its effectiveness and increase its long-term costs.
Risks and strategic costs of collusion
While collusion may offer short-term signaling value, it carries strategic costs for China. First, the most immediate risk is that closer coordination with Russia and the DPRK would strengthen, rather than weaken, U.S.-Japan-ROK alignment. Studies focused on alliance dynamics argue that visible bloc-tilting by China reinforces threat perceptions in Seoul and Tokyo, making trilateral cooperation appear not only justified but necessary.[5]
From South Korea’s perspective, closer China-DPRK ties raise doubts about Beijing’s willingness to prioritize stability on the Peninsula over strategic competition. As a result, Seoul is more likely to deepen operational reliance on the U.S. and expand trilateral military coordination. This dynamic, in turn, reduces China’s ability to influence South Korean choices and narrows diplomatic space.[6]
A second major cost concerns nuclear proliferation pressure. If China is perceived as accommodating or shielding a nuclear-armed DPRK – particularly amid expanding DPRK–Russia military cooperation – domestic debates in South Korea and Japan over alternative deterrence arrangements are likely to intensify.[7] This outcome would run counter to China’s long-standing position on denuclearization and increase long-term instability in Northeast Asia.
Third, collusion risks damaging China’s international image as a stabilizing actor. Symbolic actions, such as joint military signaling or tolerance of sanctions-evading activities, are often interpreted externally as evidence of bloc politics, regardless of Beijing’s stated intentions. Such perceptions undermine China’s credibility when calling for restraint, dialogue, and de-escalation. Russia and China have already conducted joint airspace military exercises on the East China Sea ten times in a row.[8]
Taken together, these risks suggest that collusion is a high-visibility but low-control strategy. It accelerates alliance consolidation, increases escalation and proliferation risks, and reduces China’s diplomatic flexibility. From a cost-benefit perspective, collusion is therefore better understood as a risk scenario to be avoided or managed, rather than a sustainable response to trilateral alignment.
Policy implications: Why collusion should be avoided
While collusion may appear to offer short-term leverage, it is not a sustainable strategy for China. Its costs – in terms of alliance consolidation, proliferation pressure, and diplomatic credibility – outweigh benefits. As a result, China’s policy focus should be on managing and avoiding the collusion pathway, rather than drifting into it by default.
First, China should be cautious about actions that could be interpreted as bloc formation. Even limited or symbolic coordination with Russia and the DPRK tends to be amplified externally and framed as strategic alignment. Once such perceptions take hold, they are difficult to reverse and reduce China’s ability to present itself as an independent stabilizing actor in Northeast Asia.
Second, avoiding collusion requires active alternatives, not passive restraint. In particular, China should invest more diplomatic effort in stabilizing relations with South Korea. Improved political communication, economic cooperation, and people-to-people exchanges can help reduce Seoul’s sense of vulnerability and lower its reliance on trilateral military mechanisms.[9] This does not require weakening China’s core interests, but rather adjusting the tone and instruments of engagement.
Third, functional dialogue with Japan remains important, even amid political differences. Crisis-prevention mechanisms, maritime communication channels, and cooperation on non-traditional security issues can help manage risks and reduce misperceptions. While these steps may not alter Japan’s alliance commitments, they can limit escalation dynamics.
Finally, China’s approach to the Korean Peninsula remains central. Demonstrating restraint, encouraging stability, and maintaining dialogue-oriented signaling toward the DPRK reinforce China’s long-standing position on peace and denuclearization. This helps counter narratives that portray China as enabling instability.
Overall, the key policy implication is that collusion should be treated as a risk to be managed, not a strategy to be pursued. By avoiding high-visibility alignment and prioritizing reassurance, communication, and selective engagement, China can preserve strategic flexibility and contribute more effectively to regional stability.
[1] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. August 18, 2023. “The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea.” Retrieved from https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100541826.pdf.
[2] Prime Minister’s Office of Japan. August 18, 2023. “Commitment to Consult Among Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States.” Retrieved from https://japan.kantei.go.jp/content/000133678.pdf.
[3] Curtis, Lisa & Kelley, Hannah & Wright, Evan. March 2024. “Forging a New Era of U.S.–Japan–South Korea Trilateral Cooperation.” Center for a New American Security. Retrieved from https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/U.S.-Japan-KoreaTrilateralCooperation_Report2023_Final-1.pdf.
[4] Bailey, Hannah & Hall, Todd H. December 6, 2025. “What Does China Want? Depends Which China You’re Talking About.” The Diplomat. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2025/12/what-does-china-want-depends-which-china-youre-talking-about/.
[5] Economy, Elizabeth. December 9, 2025. “How China Wins the Future: Beijing’s Strategy to Seize the New Frontiers of Power.” Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/how-china-wins-future-elizabeth-economy.
[6] Bang, Chan Young. April 23, 2021. “The US Needs China’s Support to Denuclearize North Korea.” The Diplomat. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2021/04/the-us-needs-chinas-support-to-denuclearize-north-korea/.
[7] Brunnstrom, David & Martina, Michael. April 25, 2024. “Exclusive: China Harbors Ship Tied to North Korea-Russia Arms Transfers, Satellite Images Show.” Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/world/china-harbors-ship-tied-north-korea-russia-arms-transfers-satellite-images-show-2024-04-25/.
[8] Choi, Seong Hyeon. December 9, 2025. “2 Chinese, 7 Russian Jets Enter South Korean Air Defence Zone Near Japan.” South China Morning Post. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3335775/2-chinese-7-russian-jets-enter-south-korean-air-defence-zone-near-japan.
[9] Shaikenova, Anar. June 19, 2025. “How China’s Wedge Strategy Could Tip the Balance of Power on the Korean Peninsula.” Daily NK. Retrieved from https://www.dailynk.com/english/how-chinas-wedge-strategy-could-tip-the-balance-of-power-on-the-korean-peninsula/.
January 14, 2026 at 01:49AM
by DailyNK(North Korean Media)