The existence of two or three major military powers with colossal stockpiles of nuclear weapons is supposed to reduce the likelihood of Armageddon. So, has it?
In late 1945 the preeminent author of several fictional dystopias, George Orwell, published a column entitled ‘You and the Atomic Bomb.’ Addressing a wide readership, this classic of 20th-century literature suggested that the impact on the course of history of such a technological innovation as nuclear weapons would be far greater than anything that had ever happened before. We may now be approaching a time when the course of world politics will either confirm Orwell’s judgement and the predictions based on it or – tragically – disprove them.
To make matters worse, even learning from past global tensions between nuclear powers is no panacea: their position in the world has changed significantly over the past thirty years, and the most acute, indirect conflict is taking place in close physical proximity to Russia’s main administrative and industrial centers. This is why many serious observers now have some misgivings about whether the US strategy, which in the most general terms seeks to replicate the logic of confrontation with Moscow from 1945 to 1991, is the right one.
If we try to summarize Orwell’s supposition, it boils down to the fact that the acquisition by two or three powers of such tremendous opportunities to destroy not only each other, but the whole of humanity, changes the whole disposition of world history. Previously, as we know, it was always based on the ability of powers to kick back at the existing world order, and the consequences of such revolutions became fundamental to the next. Post the atomic bomb, Orwell wrote, all the nations of the world have been prevented from even thinking that such a move could be successful for them. The nuclear powers can’t because a world war would lead to their guaranteed destruction, and the small and medium-sized ones can’t because of the relative weakness of their militaries. On the face of it, it seems to be true: by acting according to the old methods, i.e. by resorting to military force, none of the developing powers can now qualitatively change their position in the world.
Hence the axiom that it is impossible to defeat a nuclear power in war and that the only threat to it is itself. That is, the inability of its political system to keep its population in relative harmony. As Orwell writes: “If, as seems to be the case, [a nuclear bomb] is a rare and costly object as difficult to produce as a battleship, it is likelier to put an end to large-scale wars at the cost of prolonging indefinitely a ‘peace that is no peace.’ The first premise has so far been confirmed. Even economically powerful China does not yet appear to have arsenals comparable to those of Russia and the US. The second – the end of major wars – needs more evidence. The accumulation of this is the main issue facing world politics today, however painful it may be for our thoughts about our own future.
Orwell writes that nuclear superpowers are states that are unconquerable and are therefore in a permanent state of ‘cold war’ with their neighbors. Yes, that is exactly what it looks like, since cold war is known to be an alternative to hot war. Few people doubt that not all practices of US or Russian foreign policy are entirely satisfactory to their respective neighbors. Notably, in the case of the Americans, for whom control over others is an important part of their own prosperity, as understood by the political establishment and its sponsors. In recent years we have seen many examples of the US treating its European or Asian allies very harshly. Germany has lost its economic privileges in the conflict between Russia and the West. France has been reduced to the position of America’s junior partner, even though it has some nuclear weapons of its own. Not to mention the Asian countries of Japan and South Korea, whose entire foreign policy is determined by Washington, often under direct pressure. None of the above countries has the power to change its position.
Cold War, in the Orwellian sense of the term, thus remains the most important feature of world politics in the nuclear age. And it is not at all surprising that the US is guided by the very rules it has learnt over the past decades. First and foremost is a lack of responsibility for the fate of those through whose hands the United States is waging its proxy war. Simply because the US does not link its own security to their survival. This means that America cannot fully understand the possible reaction of an enemy to the actions of those it uses to achieve its objectives. Because the proxies are not official representatives or citizens of US, Washington feels it’s not formally responsible for their actions. Some observers have pointed out that some radical movements in Syria receive support from abroad – for example Turkey – but this has had little effect on Russia’s relations with its sponsors.
China once actively used radical Marxist movements in Southeast Asia and provided them with various forms of support. However, this didn’t turn its relations with countries where such groups were active into a state of war. The USSR also supported various rebel movements operating against the US and its allies. But Washington did not see this as a reason for a bigger conflict. From the point of view of any normal state, only direct aggression by the other side against its national territory is a reason for war. Perhaps that’s why the US doesn’t believe its actions in Ukraine could prompt direct conflict with Russia.
But it remains to be seen to what extent such logic can work now that the conflict is taking place in the immediate vicinity of the capital of the Russian state and not, for example, in distant Afghanistan. Especially since NATO’s policy of enlargement over the past thirty years has created a number of opportunities for the US that also pose challenges. After all, the bloc’s members in Europe, especially in Eastern Europe, are perceived in Washington and Moscow as nothing more than American proxies whose involvement in hostilities has little to do with the direct threat that Russia and the US might pose to each other. Needless to say, the potential threats and upheavals that a scenario based on such an assumption could entail are enormous.
Nor should we ignore the not fully understood link between the foreign policy positions of the great powers and their domestic stability. We can see that much of the American nervousness about what is happening in the world is related to the need to continue to benefit from the overall functioning of the global political and economic system. Not only is it difficult for the US to accept change in this area because of the inertia of its thinking, but it could be dangerous until the US establishment finds other effective ways of keeping the situation under control at home. Especially since the general crisis of the socio-economic system created by the West since the mid-1970s is not going away, but only gaining momentum. Yes, generally speaking, the presence of two or three major military powers with colossal stockpiles of nuclear weapons reduces the likelihood of a general war in the traditional sense. But the state of ‘peace that is no peace’ promised by the classicists still looks like a balancing act on the verge of something that would render all theoretical constructs meaningless.
This article was first published by Valdai Discussion Club, translated and edited by the RT team.
