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Sunday, September 15, 2024

China’s Interest & Plans in Latin America and the Caribbean: Analysis

Amid the economic challenges and COVID-19, Beijing has steadily deepened its engagement with the region.

TPUwebTeam
By TPUwebTeam
ViewpointWorld

For anyone wondering where China-Latin America and Caribbean relations will go in 2022, here is a good place to start: China-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Forum Joint Action Plan (2022-2024) . As with previous ministerial level forums in 2015 and 2018, members of China and CELAC have reviewed their co-operative guidelines in various areas. Like the white papers of China’s 2008 and 2016 Latin American policy papers, and the 1 + 3 + 6 plan announced by President Xi Jinping in 2014 in Fortaleza, Brazil, this plan reflects China’s priorities in the region, even if the existing intentions are not clear. , and its unequal implementation.

Emphasis on Fields, Multilateralism, and the Developing Countries of the Small Islands

The new plan strengthens China’s ambitions to expand its relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean in many sectors of the economy, with an emphasis on infrastructure in many areas, using China’s financial vehicles, and deepening China’s presence in the country. a series of strategic technical fields. Central to the development of this partnership is the significant number of current and / or proposed China-CELAC forums (22 in total) to further specific programs.

China-LAC forums for 2022-2024

Ongoing (14)

China-LAC Infrastructure Cooperation Forum
China-LAC Business Summit
China-Latin America High Investment and Cooperation Forum
China-CELAC Infrastructure Cooperation Forum
China-Caribbean Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum
China-CELAC Forum of Agriculture Ministers
China-CELAC Science, Tech, and Innovation Forum
China-CELAC Digital Technology Anti-Epidemic Cooperation Forum
China-CELAC Forum on Poverty Alleviation and Development
China-LAC Martial Arts Exchange Forum
China-LAC Think Tanks Forum
China-CELAC Forum for Higher Education
China-CELAC Local Government Partnership Forum
China-LAC People's Friendship Forum

Proposed (8)

China-CELAC Space Cooperation Forum
China-LAC Legal Forum
China-CELAC Digital Technology Cooperation Forum
China-CELAC Transport Cooperation Forum
China-CELAC Private Sector Partnership Forum
China-CELAC University Dean Forum
China-LAC Youth Development Forum
China-LAC Media Forum

This document makes it clear that Beijing sees CELAC as a strategic vehicle for international cooperation with the hemisphere and clearly includes strengthening CELAC as an institution. Proof of that, such consolidation will come at the expense of the United States Organization (OAS), the traditional building of a multilateral region, in which the United States and Canada have a seat on the table as part of the Western Hemisphere. China has also pledged to “support the common development and mobilization” of the Latin American Forum and the East Asia Cooperation, although such inclusion is still unclear.

China has also said it will provide “critical support to strategic projects… especially in harvesting” Developing Countries in the Caribbean Small Island. China considers the Caribbean region to be geographically important because of its proximity to the United States. In addition, Beijing seeks to continue exploring the remaining eight countries with diplomatic relations with Taiwan in the Western Hemisphere, five of which are Caribbean regions (Haiti, Belize, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines). The region is also a strong voting party in the U.N. and the OAS China could have an impact on.

Protection and Compliance

In the defense sector, the new document is remarkably quiet, despite the many ongoing ongoing security cooperation programs that may not have been mentioned, perhaps reflecting the Chinese view of U.S. sensitivity. about its involvement in regional security. Although this document significantly does not have a security cooperation component, it does, however, support the ongoing China-Latin America Superior Defense Forces, a tool that could be a China-Latin America liaison tool for security issues at strategic level.

The document also addresses the promotion of cooperation in the aviation sector, between private companies and government. Although a strong partnership in space, the aviation cooperation may include a Chinese move to sell JF-17 / FC-1 to the Argentine military, in addition to pre-sale and donations of Venezuelan military aircraft and helicopters (K-8, Y. -8, Y-12 ), Bolivia (Z-9, K-8), Guyana (Y-12), Colombia (Y-12), and Costa Rica (Y-12), as well as air defense lists. systems and radars.

Most interestingly, this article briefly discusses cooperation in Antarctica. Although the Chinese have long had research centers in the region, backed by a program from southern Chile, the recent Beijing government’s decision to build a tropical power plant in Ushuaia, as well as a possible location for space communications in the region, raises hopes for increased strategy. of China, which includes the Xue Long II icebreaker and PLA Navy vessels, in the region.

Legally, the document builds on the language of the pre-2019-2022 plan which means China’s goal of increasing cooperation with the Latin American government in many areas including cybersecurity, anti-drug, money laundering and anti-corruption. Although the United States also cooperates with Latin American governments in these areas, such cooperation could be a relatively new area in China, and could provide sensitive information about Latin American military and civilian operations, US training, and the risk to private sector officials. and regional governments that may rely on anti-corruption investigations.

Trade, Investment, and Mining

In many places, though just kind, this document highlights China’s progress to protect access to regional resources, markets, and technologies under favorable conditions. For example, the reference to “co-operation in the judiciary” could be understood as Beijing’s attempt to improve understanding and influence the legal institutions of Latin America that impact the operations of its companies in the region.

The names of the program contain a strong emphasis on language borrowed from the current Chinese government policy agenda, including Xi’s Global Development Initiative, which emphasizes the determination to focus on “green” investment and technology programs.

Although this article is open about China’s interest in agricultural trade in Latin America, its interest in the region’s mineral resources is very appealing. References in the energy category affecting China’s interest in “national mining resources and energy,” for example, can be understood as an indication of its ongoing work to protect lithium access in Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, and Mexico. (Bacanora).

In terms of infrastructure, text references and efforts build on the vague but constructive language in the previous 2019-2022 plan regarding the development of Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative in the region. It underscores China’s desire to not only expand its position in transport projects such as ports, highways, railways, city municipal systems, and river transport, but also in its power generation and transmission, communications, e-commerce, and location, among others. . In addition to the ongoing China-CELAC Infrastructure Cooperation Forum, the latest Joint Action Plan talks about the proposed new “Transportation Cooperation Forum”, which is the only document in which it says a new forum should be launched “as soon as possible. . ”

This article discusses working with “climate change,” which may include construction projects funded by loans to reduce the effects of rising sea levels, or to rebuild or strengthen facilities affected by climate change. Cooperation in “climate change” may also be a reference to Chinese activity in many areas for the generation and transmission of renewable energy. China is currently seeking to improve its technology through loan-financing projects operated by its companies, including wind farms, photovoltaic arrays, electric vehicles and buses, hydroelectric power plants, or nuclear industries (perhaps at the Angra complex in Brazil, in addition to agreed terms of operation. Chinese at Atucha complex of Argentina), among others. Indeed, the program clearly highlights nuclear power promotion and related personnel training in a special category.

Finance

In the context of China’s funding programs, the document covers but also goes beyond the previous language regarding support from Chinese policy banks or co-financing funds. It discusses deepening cooperation between Chinese and Latin American financial institutions, and specifically mentions cooperation between the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) established by China and the BRICS New Development Bank and regional financial institutions such as Latin America Development Bank (CAF) and Caribbean Development. Bank.

As in previous Chinese policy campaigns, such financial partnerships are designed not only to provide financing for the benefit of Chinese companies, but as a second benefit, as part of a broader global strategy to promote the use of Chinese renminbi as a form of international currency and transportation. away from the domination of the dollar in global trade and commerce. Indeed, the document clearly states an increase in “local currency payments” (e.g. to avoid buying in dollars).

5G and Cybersecurity

The article specifically notes China’s interest in expanding its cooperation in a range of strategic technologies, including 5G, “big data,” cloud computing, Internet of Things, and artificial intelligence. Significantly, the interest in launching other “Smart Cities” programs, a place where China is developing with projects such as ECU-911, BOL-911, and others raises serious concerns about privacy, as well as empowering China to access data and not just human mobility. , but also their financial, health, and other sensitive information.

The program also provides a new impetus for online co-operation, which includes co-operation in establishing norms and standards, as well as cybercrime and cybersecurity. Such cooperation means the ability to set profitable standards for Chinese suppliers such as Huawei, as well as to give Chinese access to information and regional government and online security personnel to monitor them. Such measures undoubtedly build on China’s Global Initiative on Data Security, China’s efforts to combat the United States “Clean Network” program designed to limit the presence of unscrupulous Chinese merchants from global facilities, and cyberespionage-related concerns.

Space Cooperation

In the space arena, China lays down the mark for its interest in expanding its cooperation with China-CELAC proposed cooperation cooperation platform. The China-CELAC 2022-2024 program explicitly states Beijing’s interest in promoting the use of the Beidou satellite in the region (possibly a competitor to the US-created Global Positioning System), inviting Latin American countries to join China’s proposed monthly survey to the station, and the Chinese-Latin partnership with the new Latin America and the Caribbean Space Agency, as well as other forms of cooperation. All of this is in addition to China’s already significant work on developing and launching satellites in Brazil, Venezuela, and Bolivia, the deep space radar in Neuquen, Argentina, and astronomical centers in Argentina and Chile, among others.

Health and Food Security

In the area of ​​health and medical engagement, China intends to continue to sell COVID-19 vaccines in Latin America, which include production in certain countries in the region, as well as possible development of vaccines in “integrated research facilities” as COVID-19 types continue to emerge. As elsewhere, the language of medical interaction in this text also raises the issue of self-employment. For example, it talks about “anti-epidemic loans” for building health infrastructure, which may be the hospitals and equipment that will be provided by Chinese providers using Chinese credit.

Other acknowledgments of Latin America’s economic and economic needs include promised cooperation on food insecurity and poverty alleviation, although both could be interpreted as opening the door for Chinese companies to provide regional financial services, such as the acquisition by Chinese company COFCO – the Nidera and Noble commodity firms food distribution, or Chinese construction firms have used Chinese policy bank loans (not donations) to build low-income Latin American government housing.

Educational and Cultural Exchange

The plan underscores China’s continued growth of human-to-human communication and soft power. It notes the continued support of the China-CELAC Academic Forum, an opportunity for Latin American-focused academics to travel to China on a long, often-covered trip by the Chinese government, and to discuss the potential benefits of China-LAC cooperation field.

In addition to these forums, in conjunction with the 2019-2022 program, Beijing has announced that it will provide 5,000 bursaries for Latin Americans to study in China, as well as 3,000 “training centers” and a “1,000 skills program” for Latin American youth, an environment that can be discussed.

The document also discusses support for the continued expansion of Confucius Institutions in the region, which is strange given the previous attempt to rename the Confucius Institutes, or at least separate their funding from the Chinese Cultural Fund Hanban, due to public controversy over Confucius Institutes‘ propaganda participation. It also encourages Latin American and Caribbean countries to incorporate Mandarin into the national curriculum, although there is no such comment about Chinese students needing to learn Spanish or English. This raises the Chinese unequal attitude, which is one way about cultural trade.

Media Relations and “Hate Speech”

In its section on media coverage, the document contains possible references, both sides of the issue of “hate speech,” and “terrorism.” China has a history of using communications and internet technology as state vehicles to suppress anti-government rhetoric on issues such as Tiananmen Square, Hong Kong, and the arrest of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Meanwhile, dictatorial Latin American countries such as Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba have used anti-terrorism laws to ban opposition groups and arrest dissidents.

China-Latin America’s cooperation with “hate speech” or “terrorism” raises the risk of China’s greater assistance to friendly powers to monitor communications, as well as to identify and detain or oppress state enemies. Huawei technology helped Cuban communications agency ETESCA shut down communications between protesters in July 2021, and in Venezuela the Chinese company CEIEC helped the Maduro regime spy on its opponents.

Although this document is limited in its international media coverage, it does not significantly reflect the support of CELAC members in the Olympic Winter Olympics, the oblique jab in US efforts and other Western governments boycotting the Games due to human rights violations in China. Xinjiang Uyghurs and other unacceptable behaviors.

Conclusion

The health, economic, and financial pressures of COVID-19 have made Latin America and the Caribbean a major threat to China’s development, including China’s growing importance as a regional buyer, lender and investor, and potential potential buyer. be a consumer. of corporate operations in the region as the US and other Western industries seek to sell goods in order to focus on more active markets. At the same time, the social and political pressures in the region have exacerbated the frustrations of widespread corruption, violence, economic stagnation, and inequality in the region, in order to gain the unprecedented number of people and other surviving governments. working with the Chinese. In this context, as China prepares to expand its commercial presence and impact on the region in an unprecedented way, the China-CELAC 2022-2024 program provides a comprehensive indication of the indications that the Chinese government and companies are interested in pursuing. .

Regional leaders must ensure that engagement with Beijing and other extra-hemispheric players occurs in a rules-based framework of transparency and equality, under the supervision of strong institutions with technically qualified personnel, and with the full enforcement of relevant national laws on all actors. This will help bolster the region’s sovereignty, as well as maximize the benefits and control the risk of dealing with China – in 2022 and for years to come.

The views expressed in the article are those of the authors of original website and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. government.

SourceThe Diplomat

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