Some four months have passed since North Korean leader Kim Jong Un asserted that two states exist on the Korean Peninsula, denying the concept of national reunification, and ordered that the North’s constitution define South Korea as the “invariable principal enemy.”
However, the follow-up to this order remains shrouded in fog. The Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) — the North’s legislature with the authority to amend the constitution — has yet to even hold elections for new deputies for the 15th Assembly, despite the five-year term of the 14th Assembly ending in March. This suggests that the matter is a conundrum with many factors to consider.
Amending the constitution
We can postulate two ways for North Korea to amend its constitution: 1) a “rushed method” in which an amendment is passed by a final meeting of the 14th SPA, which could be convened at any time, or 2) a “pouring wine into a new wineskin” method in which a new SPA is composed, even if this takes a bit of time.
Both methods have their advantages and drawbacks. However, we must consider 1) that including territorial provisions into the North Korean constitution would represent an epoch-making watershed in the history of the North Korean regime, 2) Pyongyang must sufficiently consider the ramifications that will follow new territorial provisions (or as North Korea puts it, drawing a border) and craft responses, 3) North Korea is now focusing on stabilizing its domestic and international situation, including implementing its “20×10” regional development program and promoting cooperative ties with China and Russia, and 4) May is an especially sensitive period with a series of major diplomatic events scheduled, including summits between China and Russia, North Korea and Russia and South Korea, China and Japan.
Given this, this writer believes method number two, in which North Korea can comprehensively survey the moves of South Korea and other surrounding nations in the course of electing new deputies and convening a new SPA, is a bit more likely than method number one, when measures materialize in a short period. This is because Kim Jong Un can raise tensions — necessary for him to take control of the situation on the Korean Peninsula — simply by making verbal threats or provocations using strategic or tactical weapons such as spy satellites.
Moreover, considering North Korea’s system of unitary leadership under Kim and party supremacy, the country — regardless of the circumstances — will likely amend its party regulations or amend its constitution only after Kim has proclaimed the significance of the matter to local and international audiences through a speech before a plenary meeting of the party.
Potential territorial articles
Based on Kim’s speech before the SPA on Jan. 16, it appears North Korea’s constitutional amendment references examples of divided nations such as South Korea and Taiwan, as well as Russia (a federation), East Germany (which acknowledged two states) and Austria (a separate state despite ethnic ties to Germany). However, this piece will avoid discussions of the international or domestic legal particulars of those cases in favor of guessing the direction of that amendment based on Kim’s speech and trends in North Korea.
To begin from the end, I believe North Korea is more likely to legislate the big ideas first and fill in the provisions later. This is because Kim’s argument in favor of two states may have comprehensively taken into account both local and international elements, but this writer believes domestic issues — namely the need for a North Korean Iron Curtain that fundamentally blocks the entry of South Korean pop culture — are at the heart of the matter. Accordingly, I believe North Korea will focus on stabilizing the shaky regime by “permanently systematizing the existing inter-Korean border” (with a few minor adjustments) and intensifying counterespionage education and crackdowns than by adding new, provocative territorial definitions that could drive the Korean Peninsula to ruin. The core content of any new constitutional amendment is as follows.
Firstly, a comprehensive provision will likely define the territory of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) — North Korea’s official name — as the Korean Peninsula and its attached islands. This could present a territorial conflict with South Korea as it clashes head-on with Article 3 of the South Korean constitution, but given North Korea’s de-facto possession of nuclear weapons, Pyongyang will probably reduce potential problems with the following provisory clauses while simultaneously using the parent provision as a basis for “communizing the peninsula by force,” i.e., using nuclear weapons to seize South Korea in wartime.
Secondly, the provisory clauses will likely define the DPRK’s actual borders. They may stipulate that the so-called South Korean puppets are illegally occupying areas south of the border while provisionally defining the border as areas north of the armistice line on land and either drawing a “new middle line” near the NLL or declaring a new “no transit buffer zone” between the NLL and the North’s self-declared patrol line at sea.
North Korea stands more to gain than lose by making strategic and tactical concessions regarding the NLL and adopting a permanent dividing line rather than stubbornly insisting on aggressive lines such as its 1999 West Sea patrol line and 2007 patrol line that could lead to naval confrontations, limited clashes and full-scale war.
This is to say, by successfully implementing a two-state ideology, Kim Jong Un can focus on standing fully alone through internal crackdowns — including on South Korean pop culture — and distancing himself from his predecessors, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, while at the same time wielding another sword at the Yoon Seok Yul administration in South Korea. Above all else, he can also create an international legal basis to deal harshly with leaflets, broadcasts and video material entering North Korea from the South, one of the Kim Jong Un government’s biggest headaches.
“As the southern border of our country has been clearly drawn, the illegal ‘northern limit line’ and any other boundary can never be tolerated, and if the ROK violates even 0.001 mm of our territorial land, air and waters, it will be considered a war provocation. In my opinion, we can specify in our constitution the issue of completely occupying, subjugating and reclaiming the ROK and annexing it as a part of the territory of our Republic in case a war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula.” (Kim Jong Un’s policy speech before SPA on Jan. 16)
Thirdly, North Korea will likely include “Kim Jong Un” and “Mount Paektu bloodline” in the constitution. Lending support to this argument is that while the current constitution mentions Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, efforts to idolize Kim Jong Un are ongoing, including the recent use of the title “Sun” to refer to the youngest Kim rather than Kim Il Sung. The title of the constitution will likely change from the “Kim Il Sung-Kim Jong Il constitution” to the “Kim Il Sung-Kim Jong Il-Kim Jong Un constitution, and a provision may be added on permanent leadership succession within the Mount Paektu bloodline, as was included in the “Ten Principles for the Establishment of a Monolithic Ideological System” when they were amended in June 2013.
Fourth, North Korea will likely erase or change terminology on national unity and reunification as per Kim’s order and take broader measures such as scrapping inter-Korean agreements such as the 1991 Inter-Korean Basic Agreement, which defined North-South relations as a “special interim relationship.” On the other hand, regulations stipulating Pyongyang as the capital, the national anthem, national flower and other symbols were already included in the Socialist Constitution of the DPRK when it was amended in 1972, making separate measures unnecessary.
Final words
The measures to amend the North Korean constitution and the presumptions I presented here are simply one possible scenario. To come up with the forecast, I gathered my thoughts focusing on a “check process” in response to various scenarios rather than specifically answering one question.
Of course, the forecast could be wrong. However, I’m reasonably confident that 1) work on amending the constitution that began per Kim’s order is encountering several difficulties at the working level; 2) the two-nation theory — in contrast to the harsh rhetoric — will likely focus on “creating an environment where the two Korea’s can live separately for the time being,” that is to say, the defensive, rather than inserting aggressive clauses in the constitutional amendment, give the very defensive and closed nature of the policy; and 3) Kim’s diplomatic clock is tuned to sometime after 2025, following the U.S. presidential election in November.
In ending this piece, I would like to appeal to the South Korean government and people. North Korea’s “two-state narrative” presents South Korea with risk and opportunity. Seoul must never shrink before Kim Jong Un’s threat. South Korea can adequately respond to whatever move North Korea makes. In fact, I believe that South Korea now has an opportunity to liberate our Northern brothers and sisters from the shackles of oppression and that we must put our heads together. It is always darkest before the light. Let us prepare. And then prepare again.
Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.
Views expressed in this guest column do not necessarily reflect those of Daily NK. Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
May 08, 2024 at 12:30PM
by DailyNK(North Korean Media)