North Korea’s Kim Jong Un first introduced the concept of two hostile states in late 2023, framing South Korea as the country’s foremost enemy. Since then, his government has claimed to have codified the doctrine in the Workers’ Party of Korea’s party rules and in the North Korean constitution. South Korea’s unification minister has responded by putting forward a “peaceful two-state theory” — an approach that mirrors Pyongyang’s framing but softens its tone. The rush to embrace this framing, however, may be doing more harm than good, and the evidence that the doctrine has even been formally enshrined remains far from conclusive.
North and South once shared a common premise on unification
The dictionary definition of “unification” is the act of combining divided entities into one. Historically, the Korean peninsula has undergone two major unifications: the Silla Kingdom’s unification of the Three Kingdoms in 667, and the Goryeo Dynasty’s reunification in 936. The subsequent Joseon Dynasty, which endured for more than 500 years, was not a unification but a dynastic transformation. In 1910, Japan annexed Korea, and when Japan surrendered in 1945, the fate of the peninsula was determined largely by the United States and the Soviet Union. The result was the establishment of two mutually hostile systems — and a fratricidal war.
After the Korean War, both Koreas pursued competing visions of unification while still accepting the premise that the Korean people were one nation. North Korea proposed a federal system; South Korea countered with a confederal model. The goals and methods diverged sharply, but the destination was the same: a unified state. Until North Korea adopted its socialist constitution in 1972, Pyongyang even designated Seoul as its capital. And South Korea’s own constitution has long explicitly refused to recognize North Korea as a separate, sovereign state.
Kim Jong Un formally introduced his “hostile two-state theory” in 2023. In 2026, he claimed to have incorporated it into both the WPK party rules and the North Korean constitution, and South Korea’s unification minister responded by endorsing a “peaceful two-state theory.” Whatever modifier is attached, the substance is the same: an acceptance of North Korea’s framing. That acceptance runs directly counter to the South Korean constitution.
More troublingly, the acceptance has come too quickly. It has not yet been independently confirmed whether the two-state doctrine has actually been written into the WPK party rules or the North Korean constitution. As has happened before, this may still amount to nothing more than words from Kim Jong Un. The doctrine should not be treated as a fait accompli until the revised party rules and the revised constitution have been directly verified. Kim Yo Jong’s statement on April 6, 2026 only deepens that uncertainty.
Kim Yo Jong’s statement contradicts the two-state doctrine
The core of the two-state theory is that South Korea is Enemy No. 1 — a state to be shunned entirely. It is, in essence, a declaration that Pyongyang will not engage with Seoul regardless of what Seoul does. Yet when President Lee Jae-myung expressed regret over a drone incursion into North Korean airspace, Kim Yo Jong responded immediately — and positively.
“President Ri Jae-myong of South Korea stated that he expresses regret over the irresponsible and reckless actions that provoked unnecessary military tension in connection with the incident involving his side’s drones violating the airspace of the Republic.”
“Our government evaluates it as greatly fortunate and a wise course of action for his own sake that the president personally expressed regret and mentioned preventive measures.”
Kim Yo Jong called the response “a wise course of action,” and even quoted Kim Jong Un himself describing the South Korean president as “a frank and bold person.” Is this what treating South Korea as Enemy No. 1 looks like? If the two-state doctrine had genuinely been enshrined in the constitution, such a response would itself constitute a violation of that constitution. One could argue that the supreme leader and the Paektu bloodline transcend the constitution, or that this was a tactical move in the broader strategy toward the South. But it equally supports the reading that the two-state doctrine has not yet been formally codified at all.
Kim Yo Jong’s statement combined praise for President Lee with a warning that “all reckless provocations must cease” and that South Korea would “face a price it cannot bear.” The dual message is consistent with a broader pattern: using the two-state doctrine as a strategic instrument to keep pressure on Seoul, rather than as a settled constitutional reality.
North Korea’s state newspaper Rodong Sinmun, the official organ of the WPK and North Korea’s most authoritative media outlet, has not run a single editorial on the two-state doctrine in the past year and eight months. When the party establishes a line or policy, Rodong Sinmun is the primary vehicle for propagating and explaining it to the population through news coverage, editorials, and analytical commentary. Its sustained silence is telling.
Even after Kim Jong Un described the two-state doctrine as a permanent, final decision at the Ninth Party Congress — a landmark congress held in February 2026 during which Kim announced sweeping ideological and strategic directives — Rodong Sinmun published no editorial on the subject. Even after Kim’s speech to the Supreme People’s Assembly (15th convocation) on March 23, 2026, in which he declared South Korea “officially recognized as the most hostile state” in the constitution, Rodong Sinmun remained silent on the two-state doctrine. This is the same pattern observed over the preceding year and a half. It may be premature to draw firm conclusions, but the pattern is hard to ignore.
What Rodong Sinmun has been promoting instead is “the ideology of putting the popular masses first” — a formulation that serves as a stand-in for Kim Jong Un’s personal governing ideology. Editorials have consistently called on the entire population to emulate Kim Jong Un’s devotion to the people, framed as the most scientific basis for national strength. The two-state doctrine, described as a fundamental shift in the country’s worldview, is conspicuously absent from this messaging.
Confusion over unification policy
Before Kim Jong Un introduced the two-state theory, North Korea’s official justification for unification was the “liberation of South Korea.” Designating South Korea as a hostile foreign state rendered that rationale obsolete. Kim has since moved from dismissing unification entirely to framing the possible subjugation of South Korea as a defensive response to enemy aggression. It is worth noting that North Korea enshrined its nuclear force policy in the constitution in September 2023, and introduced the two-state doctrine just three months later, in December 2023. The sequencing strongly suggests the two-state framing was designed, at least in part, to provide ideological justification for a preemptive nuclear strike against the South.
South Korea has not been passive in absorbing this framing. The two-state doctrine upended the unification debate within South Korean society and ultimately helped produce the “peaceful two-state theory” now being advanced by the unification minister. That concept was first floated in August 2024 by a North Korea specialist who now serves as unification secretary at the presidential office — before a majority of experts had even accepted that the doctrine had been constitutionally enshrined. And as I noted at the time, it had not been conclusively enshrined as of October 2024 either. The same caution applies now.
Kim Jong Un’s two-state doctrine emerged as a vehicle for justifying preemptive nuclear strikes against South Korea. The appropriate response is scrutiny, not accommodation. The fact that South Korea’s unification minister has responded to it by advancing a “peaceful two-state theory” — without calling out, even once, the explicit nuclear first-strike guidelines that North Korea has codified — is deeply troubling. Kim Jong Un openly declared at both the Ninth Party Congress and the Supreme People’s Assembly that North Korea’s nuclear force policy has been constitutionalized. Why has South Korea remained silent about the illegitimacy of that declaration?
The unification secretary has argued that the “peaceful two-state theory” is not an endorsement of North Korea’s federal system but a temporary arrangement within the framework of South Korea’s confederal approach. That is a generous reading. At minimum, it ignores the special relationship that has defined inter-Korean ties. It also tends to prioritize simultaneous U.N. membership — both Koreas joined the United Nations in 1991 — over South Korea’s constitutional order. The argument that the 1987 constitution could not have anticipated 1991 U.N. accession has some merit. But it is worth recalling that “inter-Korean confederation” was formally articulated in the 1994 National Community Unification Formula under President Kim Young-sam, and that it explicitly recognized two systems, not two states, within the framework of one Korean nation.
The confederation model recognized two systems — not two states — and it placed the Korean nation front and center. Grafting the two-state doctrine onto that framework is a conceptual contradiction. The unification minister should withdraw the “peaceful two-state theory” without delay. At best, it undermines South Korea’s existing unification policy and the special character of inter-Korean relations. At worst, it provides the ideological groundwork for permanently entrenching and locking in the division of the Korean peninsula. South Korea must not lose sight of the constitutional imperative: unification.
The views expressed in this column are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Daily NK.
April 14, 2026 at 12:31AM
by DailyNK(North Korean Media)