Stop watching Kim Ju Ae and start watching North Korea-China ties

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Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to North Korea in June 2026 was no mere diplomatic ceremony. Timed to the 65th anniversary of the North Korea-China Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, the trip revealed both the present and future of relations between the two countries. Yet amid renewed Kim Ju Ae succession speculation, the visit’s real significance is being ignored. The trip carried weight that cannot be brushed aside, particularly regarding China’s Taiwan strategy, bilateral military cooperation and shifts in the security environment on the Korean Peninsula.

Xi published an op-ed in the Rodong Sinmun, North Korea’s main party newspaper, to mark his visit. The piece repeatedly stressed the friendship treaty, stronger strategic communication, expanded military-to-military exchanges, defense of shared core interests and the One China principle. After the summit, Kim Jong Un publicly declared his support for the One China principle.

So what deserves our attention right now? The strategic meaning of North Korea-China relations, or Kim Ju Ae? Regrettably, South Korean society has once again fixated on Kim Ju Ae. Even as a major diplomatic and security event unfolded, media outlets and some experts returned to succession theories. Some even tied the phrase “carrying on through the generations” in Xi’s op-ed to Kim Ju Ae’s prospects as successor. Read in full, the op-ed supports no such interpretation. Xi meant that he and Kim Jong Un would inherit and develop the bilateral relationship built in the Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il eras. The op-ed’s focus was the strategic relationship, not Kim Ju Ae.

A conclusion in search of evidence

Why do people keep returning to Kim Ju Ae? Because they have already settled on the conclusion that she is the successor. A report three months ago by the National Intelligence Service, South Korea’s spy agency, played a part. The problem is that we cannot verify whether that assessment rests on information from inside North Korea or simply combines public signals with expert opinion. Once the conclusion comes first, every new development gets bent to fit it.

When she stands at the center during palace visits, she is the successor. When she accompanies Kim Jong Un on inspections, she is the successor. When the word “inheritance” appears in an op-ed, she is the successor. This time, she did not appear at all, and somehow she is still the successor. The claim now is that China rejects hereditary rule, so North Korea kept her away from Xi. That logic is a rerun of arguments made during Kim Jong Un’s last visit to China. This is textbook motivated reasoning.

What if she had appeared? Analysts would surely have called it her debut before Xi as heir apparent. She is the successor if she shows up and the successor if she stays home. At that point, we are no longer dealing with analysis. We are dealing with belief.

A princess before a successor

I believe the starting point for viewing Kim Ju Ae is itself flawed. North Korea wears the outer form of a republic, but in substance it operates as a dynasty centered on the Kim family. Who, then, is Kim Ju Ae? She is Kim Il Sung’s great-granddaughter, Kim Jong Il’s granddaughter and Kim Jong Un’s daughter. Viewed dynastically, she is a princess before she is a successor. Yet when she stood at the center during a visit to the Kumsusan Palace of the Sun, the mausoleum of North Korea’s former leaders, observers read it only as proof of succession. Is it really so strange for a princess to stand in that spot in the Kim dynasty? Does a beloved daughter of the Paektu bloodline, the term North Korea uses for the ruling family’s direct line, accompanying her father to major events necessarily make her the heir? Can only a successor stand at the center? Skipping these questions and racing to the succession conclusion is precisely the problem. Hardly anyone argues for her succession based purely on her political abilities.

Consider what North Korea emphasizes most today: the “great Kim Jong Un era.” The campaign to enshrine his ideology and monolithic leadership has reached its peak. The Ninth Party Congress effectively crowned him as the country’s sole suryong, or supreme leader. The constitution revised in 2026 could fairly be called the “Kim Jong Un constitution.” All power and authority now flow to him. What would happen if Kim Ju Ae began rising as successor in this moment? Officials would inevitably start watching future power as well as present power.

People gather around an heir, and power gradually disperses. That dynamic never favors a leader pursuing absolute concentration of power. History shows that leaders who seek absolute rule avoid openly promoting a successor at the height of their authority. Moreover, a regime genuinely grooming an heir typically manages that person carefully, minimizing risks of error and delaying public scrutiny as long as possible. Kim Ju Ae, by contrast, has appeared in public for years under intense domestic and foreign media attention. Is that how a successor is normally cultivated?

What the Kim Ju Ae succession frame hides

I see Kim Jong Un strategically using his daughter instead. I have written several columns on this point. Her presence amplifies his image of absolute authority. She has also served as a check on Kim Yo Jong, his influential sister. The louder the outside world’s succession talk grows, the stronger the symbolism of the Paektu bloodline becomes at home. Time and again, the Kim Ju Ae issue has eclipsed the nuclear buildup, armament and provocations that worry the international community. Her very first appearance absorbed attention from a nuclear weapons milestone. The same happened at the Ninth Party Congress. It has happened again now. The main purpose of Xi’s visit lost out to succession coverage.

This succession frame conceals North Korea’s real warning signs. The heart of Xi’s visit was the friendship treaty, strategic cooperation between the two countries, expanded military exchanges and the One China principle. Can Kim Jong Un stop at verbal support for that principle? No. Action will follow, and we cannot rule out that concrete cooperation plans were discussed. Xi’s long-held ambition of unification with Taiwan is now linked to security on the Korean Peninsula.

Xi’s emphasis on the One China principle in the Rodong Sinmun, and Kim Jong Un’s open endorsement of it, are not matters to take lightly. Yet media outlets and some experts made Kim Ju Ae the talking point once more. The South Korean public ended up reading more about her than about the dangers of North Korea-China military cooperation.

I want to ask plainly: how long will we stay trapped in the Kim Ju Ae frame? Should we really burn our energy on succession debates when South Korea’s security demands attention? This time, the focus should have been strategic coordination between Pyongyang and Beijing, a matter directly tied to South Korea’s security.

Kim Ju Ae is now 14 years old. She is not even a party member, and remains four years away from eligibility. Even granting every assumption that she is being groomed, succession lies years in the future. North Korea-China military cooperation and the security crisis on the Korean Peninsula are today’s reality. A joint military front in a Taiwan contingency, and North Korea’s “second front” scenario of opening simultaneous hostilities on the peninsula, are no longer distant hypotheticals.

Read in Korean

June 11, 2026 at 07:08PM

by DailyNK(North Korean Media)

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