The ‘Spirit of Anchorage’ offered a face-saving compromise for everyone involved. Now it is running out of time.
In Russia-US relations, a tradition has emerged of coining catchy phrases to describe periods of rapprochement between Washington and Moscow. For example, the French term ‘détente’ (easing) was used to describe the situational compromises between the Soviet Union and the US at the height of the Cold War. And then there’s the infamous blunder by the US delegation at the 2009 Geneva talks, when a symbolic red button was presented to the Russian delegation with the word ‘peregruzka’ (overload) instead of ‘perezagruzka’ (reset) printed on it, thus ushering in the so-called ‘reset’ era at the time of the Obama administration. After US President Donald Trump’s return to the White House and the first US-Russia summit to be held in years, a new term emerged: the ‘Spirit of Anchorage’, which became a sort of political meme characterizing the interaction between the White House and the Kremlin.
Despite the varied interpretations expressed in the official statements of the two parties and the complex nature of the dialogue between Moscow and Washington, the essence of the agreements can be boiled down to a few main points:
Firstly, US sanctions are to be lifted and comprehensive bilateral relations developed (in politics, economics, culture, etc.) following the resolution of the Ukraine crisis.
Secondly, on the part of Russia, Moscow is to renounce claims to the territories of Zaporozhye and Kherson regions in their entirety, while the conflict is to be frozen along the front lines. On the part of Ukraine, Kiev is to recognize all the territories controlled by Russia as Russian, including Crimea, and withdraw its troops from Donbass.
Thirdly, Ukraine’s neutral, non-nuclear status is to be solidified. While pursuing EU membership, Ukraine will need to address disputes with various minorities (Russian speakers, Rusyns, etc.). This should create conditions for a new Eurasian security framework and eliminate issues in relations between the EU/NATO and Russia.
Thus, the ‘Spirit of Anchorage’ allows for a strategic situation in which each side could emerge from the conflict ‘without losing face’ and declare itself a formal victor. Ukraine would maintain its statehood and retain significant territory with access to the Black Sea while making progress toward European integration. Meanwhile, Russia would legally secure land access to Crimea (and the Crimean peninsula itself), thus achieving the objectives of its military campaign: demilitarization, denazification, and the protection of Donbass.
To implement the compromises agreed upon in Anchorage, however, several factors must be addressed. The primary obstacle is the regime of Vladimir Zelensky. After Zelensky’s presidential term ended in 2024, he de facto usurped power under the pretext of giving the Ukrainian government extraordinary powers to consolidate the nation against an external threat. If he were to withdraw Ukrainian troops from Donbass and sign a peace agreement, Zelensky would create the necessary conditions for elections, which he would likely lose due to public fatigue from four years of war.
Moreover, any potential presidential candidate (such as Ukrainian Ambassador to the UK, former Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Valery Zaluzhny or Defense Minister Mikhail Fedorov, etc.) has every chance of winning by promoting the thesis that the current authorities are to blame for the fact that a peace deal was not signed earlier. After all, a similar peace agreement could have been signed as early as April 2022, minimizing military and civilian casualties.
Instead, taking advantage of the voluntary withdrawal of Russian troops from Kiev and Sumy regions and prompted by former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s argument that it was impossible to sign an agreement “with a gun to one’s head,” Zelensky not only withdrew from dialogue with Russia but also passed a law prohibiting anyone from negotiating with Russia’s current government. Thus, the current leadership in Kiev has deprived itself of the political and legal tools to find a formula for resolving the conflict.
Seeing that Kiev remains the last obstacle to peace, the US launched a campaign to discredit Zelensky and his entourage, who for many years had profited from aid from the US and other NATO countries. At Washington’s instigation, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) launched a large-scale anti-corruption investigation in November of 2025 focused on multimillion-dollar embezzlement at the state-owned Energoatom company involving Timur Mindich – Zelensky’s longtime associate and co-owner of the Kvartal-95 studio. Subsequently, a high-profile criminal case was opened against Andrey Yermak – the hastily dismissed former head of the presidential office. At the same time, renowned American journalist Tucker Carlson released an interview with Yulia Mendel – former press secretary in the administration of the Ukrainian president. Mendel accused Zelensky of dictatorial management methods, drug use, and corruption at the highest levels of government. Zelensky’s position has become so critical that the UK and EU have launched a campaign to whitewash his image.
Caught between Scylla and Charybdis – i.e., Russia, with which relations have continued to deteriorate since the mid-2010s, and the US, where Donald Trump’s rise to power has placed the tensions over tariffs and the ownership of Greenland at the center of relations – current European politicians (from NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen to French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer) have set out to torpedo the peace agreements. Their aim was not so much to inflict a ‘strategic defeat’ on Russia but rather to preserve Ukraine as a sort of military and diplomatic battering ram against Russia. Kiev was to be used as a pretext to continue the militarization of European economies against the backdrop of the ongoing relocation of civilian industries to other jurisdictions (China, the USA, etc.).
However, as the US intensified its diplomatic engagement in the Ukraine conflict, Europe found itself marginalized and left out of the negotiation process, including the bilateral Russia-Ukraine talks (which resumed in the spring and summer of 2025) and the trilateral talks facilitated by the US (in early 2026). In light of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s statements on May 9 about the imminent conclusion of Russia’s Special Military Operation, Europe sought to find a way back into the negotiation process by appointing a special envoy to Moscow.
However, there was little genuine intent to resolve the conflict – not only due to the absence of a suitable candidate for this role (with potential candidates ranging from Vice-President of the European Commission Kaja Kallas and President of Finland Alexander Stubb to former Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel and former Prime Minister of Italy Mario Draghi), but also because there wasn’t much to talk about: the EU failed to agree on the parameters of the ‘airport ceasefire’ between Moscow and Kiev, which proposed halting drone strikes on airports to ease domestic and international air traffic.
Europe’s diplomatic passivity reflects growing frustration within Donald Trump’s team. Prospects for resolving the Ukraine crisis are becoming increasingly murky as attention has shifted to another regional conflict – the war with Iran. The 40-day war against Tehran created a fundamentally different strategic landscape for the US, and finding a compromise with the Islamic Republic became a higher priority than continuing mediation between Moscow and Kiev.
After the operation in which Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro was kidnapped on January 3, 2026, Trump tried the same strategy in Iran but found himself ensnared in an asymmetric conflict. Despite significant military superiority over Iran and the assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the US was not able to undermine Tehran’s resilience. Instead, these actions led to a cascade of unforeseen consequences.
Few in the White House could have anticipated that the unprovoked aggression launched by the US against Iran on February 28, 2026, would lead to Iranian strikes on US military bases and civilian infrastructure in the Gulf Arab nations, as well as a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, which has triggered one of the most severe energy crises since the 1970s. As a result, gas prices in the US have surged, and the crisis is becoming the main argument against the Republicans during the upcoming midterm elections in November. If the ruling party loses its majority in the Senate and the House of Representatives, the Democrats will likely use the remaining two years before the next presidential election to pursue the impeachment of Trump, potentially paralyzing any of the current administration’s foreign policy initiatives.
To reverse this negative trend, the White House needs a ‘small victorious war’ – a striking foreign policy success achieved at minimal cost. The prospect of regime change in Cuba appears particularly well-suited for this objective. Looking from his home in Florida across the strait at the ‘Island of Freedom’ – which has remained beyond the reach of US military forces since the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 – Trump considers the leadership of Cuba’s Communist Party easy prey. And it’s not just because of the advanced age of the country’s gray cardinal, Raúl Castro (who recently turned 94), or the deteriorating state of Cuba’s military infrastructure, but also because of the food and energy crises exacerbated by the US embargo linked to the events in Venezuela. Therefore, if Trump starts yet another military conflict in the Western Hemisphere, we can hardly expect any diplomatic activity in the Eastern Hemisphere.
In light of this, it’s important to take US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (the son of Cuban émigrés who fled communist persecution, by the way) seriously when he claims that the US is distancing itself from the Ukraine conflict. Practically speaking, this means that the ‘Spirit of Anchorage’ is more dead than alive. This sentiment has been echoed by several high-ranking officials in Russia, including Vladimir Putin’s aide, Yuri Ushakov, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, and is further illustrated by the recent hostile actions of the US, such as refusal to grant a visa to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Alimov to attend the US General Assembly meeting in New York.
However, if there’s one lesson to be learned from the behavior of this US president, it’s that even when the spirit of cooperation seems to have faded, Donald Trump can summon it back at any moment, provided he has the political will to do so.
