“Trump’s back!” As the world watches, Trump’s victory in the 47th U.S. presidential election marks his dramatic return to the White House. Given his personality, track record, and campaign promises, his domestic and foreign policy will certainly be based on “America First and NO Biden.”
What might Kim Jong Un be thinking about this news? Although he’s currently in a forbidden romance with Putin, he might be reminiscing about his unfinished bromance with Trump. Will Kim send a congratulatory message (love letter)? It’s highly likely, as he won’t want to miss this opportunity. Will Trump respond? Certainly, as he’s been talking about wanting to meet again despite being the one who ended their relationship. Will they meet soon? Probably not, as they’re both involved with other partners and will likely take their time.
Trump’s North Korea Policy
Many experts predict a shift toward negotiations based on Trump’s previous meetings with Kim Jong Un and his campaign statements favoring Kim over Biden. While all possibilities should be considered, I believe that given the U.S.’s current domestic and international situation, North Korea policy will likely begin with exploratory talks rather than rapid changes.
Trump and Kim have had three summit meetings and exchanged 27 “love letters.” They know each other well – which is precisely the problem. “Bromance Season 2” is typically harder than the first encounter. They might be dreaming different dreams from different beds.
Trump isn’t the same person he was in 2018, and North Korea isn’t his primary concern. America’s pressing issues are economic recovery, Middle East conflicts, the Russia-Ukraine war, and U.S.-China competition. Even for the Nobel Peace Prize Trump reportedly desires, resolving Middle East or Ukrainian conflicts might be easier than the North Korean nuclear issue. This explains why “Korean Peninsula denuclearization” wasn’t included in his campaign promises.
Therefore, while maintaining the goal of North Korean denuclearization under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Trump administration will likely take time to explore a “hybrid negotiation strategy” combining denuclearization and arms reduction talks to bring North Korea to the negotiating table.
Kim Jong Un’s U.S. Policy
North Korea’s current situation isn’t conducive to dialogue. As evidenced by the country’s recent unveiling of uranium enrichment facilities and launching of the Hwasong-19 ICBM before the U.S. election, North Korean leaders will likely focus on: fully establishing their “hostile two-state theory” based on their romance with Putin, succeeding in their deployment to the Russia-Ukraine war, and advancing their strategic weapons programs.
Even if North Korea’s leaders want to pressure the U.S., they will likely focus on building tension and conducting behind-the-scenes dialogue until the first half of next year, when Biden’s remaining term ends and Trump’s new administration takes shape. The biggest issue in U.S.-North Korea relations remains the nuclear question. However, the possibility of North Korea abandoning nuclear weapons is virtually zero, as evidenced by their legislation regarding nuclear possession, Kim’s directives to enhance nuclear capabilities, revelations of uranium enrichment facilities, China and Russia’s protective role, North Korean troops’ recent deployment to the Russia-Ukraine war, and the test launch of the Hwasong-19 ICBM (which North Korea claims to be the “final version”).
Therefore, North Korea will likely pursue this sequence of events: advancing nuclear capabilities and jockeying for negotiating position → arms reduction talks based on the “hostile two-state theory” (ignoring South Korea) when conditions are right → a U.S. presidential visit to Pyongyang and recognition of North Korea’s nuclear status → establishment of diplomatic relations. They will continue demanding the cessation of U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises and the withdrawal of U.N. forces and U.S. troops from South Korea.
In the shorter term, they will likely focus on exploratory moves until early 2025, possibly seeking policy changes like another U.S.-North Korea summit in the latter half. By then, the new U.S. administration will be settled, and North Korea will have several major momentum points: the Workers’ Party’s 80th anniversary (Oct. 10), completion of the five-year economic-defense development plan, and preparation for the Ninth Party Congress (scheduled for January 2026). They might use Japan as an alternative in the meantime, as new Prime Minister Ishibawa, like his predecessors Abe and Kishida, wants dialogue with Kim Jong Un. Japan is the weakest link in the U.S.-South Korea-Japan triangle, and the potential $30 billion in compensation from Japan would be appealing to North Korean leaders. Any policy shifts between the U.S. and North Korea will likely occur around the time when a Russia-Ukraine war ceasefire appears imminent.
Conclusion
For the time being, North Korean leaders will continue to ignore South Korea based on their “hostile two-state theory” while engaging in tense relations with the U.S. The U.S. will likely focus on domestic and international issues like the economy while maintaining principled positions and suggestions toward North Korea.
Therefore, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration should take a long-term approach, building strong security and conducting comprehensive practical diplomacy. Potential U.S.-South Korea conflicts, such as defense cost-sharing renegotiations, aren’t serious concerns given South Korea’s increased national status and the necessity of bilateral cooperation. These could even become opportunities.
In particular, South Korea should carefully examine and pursue elevating U.S.-South Korea relations to a higher level (e.g., conditional permission for South Korea’s nuclear armament) by leveraging Trump’s deal-making tendencies. This requires prioritizing the organization of related task forces and listing current issues. It goes without saying that South Korea should emphasize the risks of North Korea’s “ignore South Korea” strategy through special envoys and public diplomacy, ensuring U.S.-South Korea communication before and after all contacts.
While South Korea continues to strengthen its alliance with the U.S., it should also pursue two parallel tracks with North Korea. First, South Korea should persistently push for dialogue by repeatedly inviting North Korea to participate in the inter-Korean dialogue forum, as outlined in the Aug. 15 Unification Doctrine. This includes being prepared to propose a summit meeting if circumstances warrant it.
Second, South Korea must maintain active crisis management, especially during provocative situations such as North Korea’s balloon-based provocations and its military deployment to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Even though high-level talks might seem pointless given the current tensions, it’s crucial for South Korea to demonstrate proactive leadership in managing Korean Peninsula issues. This approach sends important signals simultaneously to North Korea, the United States, and the South Korean public.
As the old wisdom suggests, taking initiative is essential: “Heaven helps those who help themselves” and “The best defense is a good offense.”
Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
November 08, 2024 at 06:30AM
by DailyNK(North Korean Media)