Pyongyang’s prospects under Trump 2.0

A second Trump-Kim Jong-un meeting is likely under Trump 2.0, but what will come of it?

Trump indicated his willingness to engage with Kim in a recent Fox News interview with Hannity.^[1] If anything, Trump’s team is trying to moderate expectations. National Security Council spokesperson Brian Hughes tried to walk back Trump’s reference to North Korea as a nuclear power and insist that Trump will pursue complete denuclearization.^[2]

The larger obstacle to meaningful US-DPRK engagement does not appear to be Trump’s willingness, but his global priorities. In his Time Person of the Year interview, Trump mentioned Israel, Gaza, Ukraine, Iran, and Russia multiple times. By contrast, he mentioned North Korea only once and in reference to its activities in Ukraine.^[3] A similar question of priorities may be raised for Kim as the DPRK is tied up in these same conflicts.^[4]

A Glimpse at U.S.-China Relations under Trump 2.0

Whether or not Trump and Kim rekindle their bromance diplomacy, Pyongyang’s prospects under Trump 2.0 are also likely to be influenced by U.S.-China relations.

Any talks of DPRK denuclearization would be exponentially complicated if Trump is simultaneously pursuing arms control agreements with Russia and China.^[5] If Musk and other tech CEOs in Trump’s inner circle foster stronger U.S.-China business relations and cooperation, the U.S. and China may conceivably cooperate on North Korea as well.^[6]

On the other hand, if tariffs and security concerns dominate U.S.-China relations, then we could be heading into four years of trade wars and rising tensions. Anticipating this rift, specialists such as Chan Young Bang and Anar Shaikenova have proposed that Trump 2.0 may be an opportune time for China to seize the moment.^[7] However, North Korea’s involvement in Ukraine adds much uncertainty to an already strained Sino-DPRK relationship.^[8] Coming full circle, some see the gap between China and North Korea as America’s opportunity to impede further consolidation of an authoritarian bloc.^[9]

In short, even under Trump and Kim’s best intentions, Pyongyang’s prospects under Trump 2.0 are highly contingent on American priorities amid a host of global conflicts and the fluid triad of relations among the U.S., China, and the DPRK.

Four scenarios – a planning exercise

In a series of scenario planning exercises hosted by KIMEP University’s DPRK Strategic Research Center on January 31st, we explored Pyongyang’s prospects under Trump 2.0, contingent on four scenarios:

The U.S. engages the DPRK as U.S.-China relations improve
The U.S. engages the DPRK as U.S.-China relations worsen
The U.S. doesn’t engage the DPRK as U.S.-China relations worsen
The U.S. doesn’t engage the DPRK as U.S.-China relations improve

We considered the likelihood of four factors:

Bilateral or multilateral agreements
Deals involving DPRK military and diplomatic security
Deals involving development assistance
The DPRK to implement political and economic reforms

Scenario 1

In Scenario 1, the U.S. engages the DPRK as U.S.-China relations improve.

Although this scenario most closely resembles the 1990s era of Six-Party Talks, how likely are we to see multilateral talks under Trump 2.0? North Korea’s nuclear program is much more developed now and U.S.-China relations are far more entangled, both in terms of economic interdependence and security rivalries. Moreover, if Trump and Xi engage in arms control talks, it’s not clear where the DPRK would fit into that.^[10]

Under Scenario 1, respective bilateral engagement with China and the DPRK is more likely than a return to Six-Party or Three-Party talks. Still, a lot could be achieved with bilateral U.S.-DPRK talks. In theory, there could be a deal or a framework reminiscent of the Perry Process, adapted to reflect Trump’s pragmatism and North Korea’s stronger negotiating position. Such an agreement may overlook issues like human rights, as Trump did during his first term, and replace complete denuclearization with the more short-term, achievable goal of arms control.^[11] An incoming progressive president in South Korea would not be delighted to see the bar lowered on denuclearization, but would nonetheless join talks once a preliminary framework has been achieved.^[12]

Under Scenario 1, a Trump-Kim meeting is very likely. If talks proceed in a low-threat context, denuclearization may be on the table, but substantial outcomes are not likely unless both parties fully commit to the process. In an environment with positive U.S.-China relations and reduced tensions in East Asia, Trump will likely not see this as a high priority. The biggest obstacles in this scenario are not the negotiations themselves, but the global crises competing for Trump’s attention.

Scenario 2

In Scenario 2, the U.S. engages DPRK as U.S.-China relations worsen.

Worsening U.S.-China relations would definitely make multilateral cooperation on the DPRK less likely, but rather elevate the security threat in East Asia. This scenario may turn Trump’s attention towards East Asia. The DPRK may take advantage of this scenario by raising tensions, and U.S.-DPRK negotiations may start on rockier ground, but Trump may also be more invested in finding a resolution.

A similar deal may be possible under Scenario 2 as in Scenario 1, if Trump takes a pragmatic approach – arms control in exchange for aid and continued talks – and avoids inflammatory topics. Amid heightened security concerns between the U.S. and China, denuclearization will be an absolute non-starter.

In short, a Trump-Kim reunion is even more likely under Scenario 2 than Scenario 1, but any deal will necessarily be more pragmatic and focus on achievable short-term goals.

Scenario 3

In Scenario 3, the U.S. doesn’t engage the DPRK, and U.S.-China relations worsen.

Absent U.S. engagement with the DPRK, transparent multilateral frameworks are highly unlikely. Amid rising security tensions in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, China’s primary objective will be to discourage DPRK security provocations, disregarding any substantial reforms or formal arms control concessions. This sentiment was reflected in Xi’s statement at last November’s APEC Conference: “China does not allow conflict and turmoil to happen on the Korean peninsula.”^[13]

In an adversarial, two-bloc scenario, the DPRK may shift its strategy from provoking the U.S. to leveraging Russia against China. Kim Il-sung famously exploited the Sino-Soviet split to the DPRK’s advantage in the 1960s and 1970s.^[14] Analysts wonder if the DPRK’s recent alliance with Russia isn’t a page from that same playbook.^[15] At present, Putin also seems unconcerned that his deal with Kim may throw a wrench in the world order.^[16]

Scenario 4

In the final scenario, the U.S. doesn’t engage the DPRK, despite improvements in U.S.-China relations.

This scenario could emerge if Trump’s China policy is influenced by the tech CEOs in his coalition, and he remains too preoccupied with Ukraine, Gaza, and other global crises, therefore prioritizing them over the DPRK. As with the last scenario, transparent multilateral frameworks are highly unlikely. China is likely to engage with the DPRK pragmatically and behind closed doors.

Unlike Scenario 3, improved U.S.-China relations may lower the overall threat level in East Asia, making provocations on the Korean peninsula less likely to destabilize the region. As a result, Xi and the U.S. may pay less attention to the DPRK, resulting in a neglected DPRK resorting to greater agitation, potentially through weapons tests and expanding its military alliance with Russia.

Pyongyang’s prospects

Scenario planning reveals a few insights into Pyongyang’s prospects over the coming four years. From the DPRK’s perspective, Scenario 2 may be the most ideal as U.S.-China tensions in East Asia may provide Trump with greater incentives to strike a deal. Even in the event of favorable U.S.-China relations, multilateral talks are unlikely.

The RoK will not be happy with any scenario that deprioritizes the DPRK’s complete denuclearization, but South Korea’s incoming president will likely go along with any talks that at least address security. To that end, Scenario 2 may also be the best optimal outcome for Seoul.

From the U.S. and China’s perspective, Scenarios 1 and 4 are ideal, as stepping back from military and trade hostilities will provide each the chance to address rising economic and budgetary concerns. The DPRK is presently not a priority for either major power, but both would like to avoid a crisis on the Korean peninsula.

Realistically, there is a strong likelihood that no country’s ideal is realized.

Scenario 3 most closely resembles the status quo under the Biden administration, and at present, U.S.-China divisions appear to be widening. Even if Trump does engage with the DPRK, it’s difficult to see either side striking a meaningful, long-term framework due to the multitude of distractions competing for Trump’s attention, not to mention North Korea’s reluctance to trade away its most valuable bargaining chip.

It seems the DPRK’s prospects may yet depend on its delicate balancing of provocation and negotiation – in order to extract maximum concessions without drawing too much ire from its would-be appeasers.

Citations:

^[1] https://www.nknews.org/2025/01/donald-trump-says-he-will-reach-out-to-north-korean-leader-kim-jong-un-again/

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/24/world/asia/trump-north-korea-nuclear-talks.html

^[2] https://www.nknews.org/2025/01/trump-to-pursue-complete-denuclearization-of-north-korea-white-house-says/

^[3] https://time.com/7201565/person-of-the-year-2024-donald-trump-transcript/

^[4] https://apnews.com/article/north-korea-kim-trump-us-nuclear-ce6d2842f8de1265a6a9042990c1d6d4

^[5] https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-denuclearization-russia-china

^[6] https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/dec/27/trump-elon-musk-sriram-krishnan

^[7] https://www.scmp.com/opinion/asia-opinion/article/3290861/china-should-seize-moment-promote-peace-korean-peninsula

^[8] https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship

^[9] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/29/opinion/us-north-korea-china-russia-axis.html

^[10] https://www.foxnews.com/politics/trump-denuclearization-russia-china