North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is an ambitious gambler with some big hang-ups.
In early 2024, 13 years into his reign, Kim made a bold move by rejecting the national reunification narrative that was his grandfather’s and father’s legacy, not to mention the theoretical foundation of the regime, and instead indulging in saber-rattling and advocating the “two states” narrative of Korea.
After deciding to cut ties with South Korea, Kim took the unusual step of addressing Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida as “Your Excellency” in a message of condolence for an earthquake on the Noto Peninsula on Jan. 5. This soon elicited a positive response from Japan, and on Feb. 9, Kishida expressed his interest by personally noting that he “strongly feels the need to boldly change the status quo.”
Kim Yo Jong, a power broker in the shadow of the North Korean leadership, responded with a tantalizing statement on Feb. 15, saying that if Japan changes its stance on the issues of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and its past abductions of Japanese citizens (which we will call the “two preconditions”), “the day of the prime minister’s visit to Pyongyang may come.”
The South Korean and international press began to report that North Korea, shocked by the previous day’s announcement that South Korea and Cuba would establish diplomatic relations, was responding by pursuing dialogue with Kishida, who is eager to hold a summit with Kim.
But despite expectations of a quick breakthrough in dialogue between North Korea and Japan, and despite more than a month of behind-the-scenes contacts, Kim Yo Jong declared in a statement on Mar. 26 that North Korea was suspending dialogue with Japan. “Japan has no courage to change history [. . .] or to take the first step for the new DPRK-Japan relations,” Kim said, adding that North Korea would “reject any contact and negotiations with the Japanese side.”
Prospects for the DPRK-Japan dialogue dimmed further after critical statements by North Korean Ambassador to China Ri Ryong-nam and North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui on Mar. 29.
Look at the substance, not the surface
On the surface, North Korea’s disclosure of Japan’s confidential proposals for dialogue and its aggressive rejection of negotiations with Japan, both of which deviate from its typical diplomatic principles and practices, could be interpreted as the North’s abandonment of dialogue and negotiations.
But closed-door negotiations between low-level officials are not the kind of thing that can be abruptly stopped in light of the following factors: (1) both Kim Jong Un and Kim Yo Jong have personally raised the possibility of dialogue this year; (2) dialogue was raised shortly after Kim advanced his “two states” narrative; and (3) North Korea needs to escape its diplomatic isolation and change the narrative after South Korea’s diplomatic coup with Cuba; finally, (4) the very fact that the rhetoric and criticism exchanged by North Korea and Japan has been so open and rapid only shows how much they are interested in each other.
Let us also consider that (1) Kishida is in trouble, with an approval rating of less than 20% before the Liberal Democratic Party leadership vote scheduled for September; that (2) resuming dialogue with Japan would be a good opportunity to stir up domestic strife in South Korea and undermine trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the US and Japan (North Korea regards Japan as the weakest link in their trilateral relationship); and that (3) North Korea is currently pursuing long-term projects that require large amounts of resources, including its 20×10 regional development policy. Taking all these considerations into account, I think it would be rather hasty to assume that North Korea has completely written off dialogue with Japan.
Instead, our preparations should be based on the assessment that North Korea’s heavy-handed pressure tactics amount to brinkmanship aimed at forcing Japan’s hand on the “two preconditions”. This is also evident in Kishida’s comments on Mar. 28 that he “still believes a summit would contribute to peace and stability in the region,” despite the cold shoulder he has received from North Korea.
Assessments and projections
North Korea and Japan began negotiations on the normalization of their relations in 1990 and reached notable milestones with the Tripartite Declaration (between the Workers’ Party of Korea and the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan and the Socialist Party of Japan) in September 1990, the North Korea-Japan Pyongyang Declaration in September 2002, and the Stockholm Agreement in May 2014. But efforts to implement these various agreements have never made much progress because of the obstacles of the abductee issue and North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs.
North Korea’s main goal in normalizing relations with Japan is to seek reparations from Japan, while Japan’s main goal is to resolve the abductee issue and secure a position as a regional peacemaker. But since Kim Jong Un is in no hurry to open up the country and is not in danger of being replaced, he is taking his time and employing various tactics in dealing with Japan.
In the future, Kim can also look forward to building a multifaceted system of cooperation with Russia, given Russia’s demand for armaments in its war against Ukraine and Putin’s promised visit to North Korea, which will happen sooner or later.
This year also marks the 75th anniversary of North Korea’s establishment of diplomatic relations with China, and exchanges and cooperation between the two countries are taking place at various levels. These facts suggest that North Korea need not worry too much about establishing contact with Japan.
But Kishida’s position is quite different. He has proposed holding a summit with North Korea without preconditions to resolve the abductee issue, and right now he needs some kind of dramatic turnaround before the leadership election in September. He knows better than anyone that former Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s approval rating jumped more than 20% immediately after he visited North Korea and adopted the Pyongyang Declaration in 2002.
Therefore, Kishida is likely to keep knocking on the North Korean door, regardless of the response he receives. He may also try to get Biden’s blessing for Japanese dialogue with North Korea when the two men hold a summit in Washington on Apr. 10.
Going forward, the most important factor in North Korea’s decision on whether or not to resume dialogue with Japan is likely to be (1) whether Japan changes its stance on North Korea’s “two preconditions.” Other factors include (2) North Korea’s strategic and tactical assessment of the formation of a neo-Cold War alignment between North Korea, China and Russia on the one hand and South Korea, the U.S. and Japan on the other, and any related plans it may have; (3) an analysis of the speed and scope of opening up to the outside world based on the “two-state” narrative; (4) the continuation of the war in Ukraine, which has broad implications for the economy, foreign policy, military, and technology; (5) the course of the U.S. presidential election; and (6) the need for Japan to act as a mediator in the event of rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
From the Japanese perspective, North Korea represents (7) a political game that Kishida can play before the September leadership vote; (8) a chance to give national interest a greater role in foreign policy amid the formation of a neo-Cold War orientation; and (9) being part of North Korea’s path to becoming a “normal country.”
Conclusions and responses
Summing up the discussion thus far, we can draw up the following roadmap for North Korea’s course of action: playing hard to get in 2024, initiating full-fledged dialogue in 2025, and normalizing diplomatic relations and selling off the right to claim damages for cash in 2026. Pyongyang’s strategies for the short term, mid-term and long term are inevitably linked to the outcome of the U.S. presidential election this coming November.
(1) Likely scenario
We can imagine the following scenario, which I break down in detail here. (A) For now, North Korea keeps pressuring Japan to give ground on its “two preconditions.” (B) The North ratchets up tensions with one-off provocations and local clashes occurring after it revises its constitution (crisis management/weakening trilateral cooperation between South Korea, the US and Japan). (C) North Korea carries out a seventh nuclear test before the US presidential election in November (cementing status as a nuclear weapon state). (D) In 2025, it pursues arms reduction talks with the new US administration and launches negotiations to normalize relations with Japan. (E) The Ninth Party Congress is held early, in October 2025 (unveiling a new policy line for the fourth phase of Kim’s rule). (F) North Korea uses diplomatic relations with Japan to secure funds in exchange for forfeiting the right to claim damages.
(2) Role of the government
Therefore, the South Korean government should not assume that the North Korea-Japan talks have been scuttled. It is true that North Korea’s two preconditions are fundamental issues that would not be easy for Japan to accept. But that does not mean negotiations are impossible.
Both politics and diplomacy are fickle things — and opposites attract, as they say. It would be wiser to hash out a range of contingency plans with the assumption that it is just a matter of time before North Korea and Japan reach an agreement.
It has already been 35 years since North Korea and Japan began negotiations to normalize their relations, and North Korea’s nuclear weapon and missile development has already rounded the last corner and is headed for the finish line. Right now, the North Korean leaders are likely considering what actions they should take when those development programs are complete.
In other words, Kim may envision the Ninth Party Congress, which will be his third party congress since taking power, as a milestone for building a completely independent and powerful socialist state. In the near term, it is also possible that small-scale skirmishes will occur between South and North Korea after Pyongyang adds a territorial provision based on the “two states” narrative to the North Korean constitution.
As such, the South Korean government needs to thoroughly prepare for the possibility of Kishida following in the footsteps of Moon Jae-in and Donald Trump.
We must not disregard recent developments including the comment by Mira Rapp-Hooper (senior director for Indo-Pacific Affairs with the U.S. National Security Council) on Mar. 4 that the US would consider “interim steps” aimed at North Korea’s denuclearization, as well as the Russian veto on Mar. 28 blocking the extension of an expert panel that has been monitoring violations of sanctions against North Korea. Everything is connected; everything has an impact.
So the important thing is working closely with Japan and the US. We should neither prevent Japan from making contact with North Korea, nor disregard any contact it makes. In the global community, the only consideration is each country’s national interest. Recall that many are willing to “make a deal with the Devil” to prevail in elections and diplomacy. That’s why South Korea ought to proactively consult with Japan and provide information and ideas, while also urging Japan to stick to principle in its dealings with the North.
(3) The attitude of the public
But some people are still blabbering about South Korea being sidelined in geopolitical jockeying, clinging to an outdated perspective marked by anti-Japanese sentiment, utopian dreams and dichotomous thinking.
Korea needs to wake up. We are not in the 20th century anymore—this is a time when every country is ready to change course and change partners at any time if that serves the national interest.
Even if North Korea and Japan do move forward with dialogue, that does not mean South Korea will be shoved to the side. Unlike the past, South Korea has a strong partnership with Japan both on a bilateral level and on a trilateral level with the US.
The Yoon administration’s “audacious initiative” and “peace through strength” policies do not conflict with Japan’s efforts to reach out to North Korea. Instead, we should opt to make full use of Japan’s potential role as a mediator. Rather than indulging in any antipathy we may feel for Japan and China, it’s time to ponder how we can make use of them.
Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler.
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April 05, 2024 at 06:30AM
by DailyNK(North Korean Media)